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JURIDIFICATION,	MEDICALISATION	AND	THE	IMPACT	OF	EU	LAW:	
PATIENT	MOBILITY	AND	THE	ALLOCATION	OF	SCARCE	NHS	
RESOURCES	
I.	 INTRODUCTION	
There	has	been	a	steady	growth	in	the	European	Union’s	(EU)	competence	in	relation	to	health	
care	in	recent	years.1	One	aspect	of	the	EU’s	involvement	in	this	area	has	been	the	objective	of	
liberalising	the	provision	and	receipt	of	health	care	across	Member	States	so	that,	on	the	one	
hand,	health	care	providers	are	able	to	offer	their	services	in	other	Member	States	and,	on	the	
other,	 individuals	 may,	 assuming	 certain	 conditions	 are	 satisfied,	 travel	 to	 another	Member	
State	to	access	health	care.	This	 liberalisation,	which	 is	designed	to	extend	to	health	care	the	
operation	 of	 the	 internal	 market	 and	 competition	 rules,	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 voluminous	
literature.2	Within	 this,	a	 recurring	 theme	 is	 the	potential	 impact	of	what	Szyszczak	calls	 ‘the	
																																																																		
1
	For	an	indication	of	the	extent	of	the	EU’s	legal	jurisdiction	in	health	care	matters,	and	the	nature	of	its	impact	on	
domestic	law,	see	T	Hervey	and	JV	McHale,	‘Law,	Health	and	the	European	Union’	(2005)	25	L.S.	228,	and	T	Hervey	
and	JV	McHale,	Health	Law	and	the	European	Union	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2004).	
2
	 See,	 for	 example,	 C	 Newdick,	 ‘Citizenship,	 Free	 Movement	 and	 Health	 Care:	 Cementing	 Individual	 Rights	 by	
Corroding	 Social	 Solidarity’	 (2006)	 43	 C.M.L.R.	 1645;	 C	 Newdick,	 ‘The	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 Trans-national	
Health	Care,	and	Social	Citizenship	–	Accidental	Death	of	a	Concept?’	(2008-2009)	26	Wisconsin	International	Law	
Journal	844;	Jost	et	al,	‘The	Role	of	Competition	in	Health	Care:	A	Western	European	Perspective’	(2006)	31	Journal	
of	Health	Politics,	Policy	and	Law	687;	A	Cygan,	‘Public	Healthcare	in	the	European	Union:	Still	a	Service	of	General	
Interest?’	 (2008)	57	 I.C.L.Q.	529;	and	 JW	van	de	Gronden	et	al	 (eds.),	Health	Care	Law	and	EU	Law	 (The	Hague:	
TMC	Asser	Press,	2011).	
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liberalisation	 of	 public	 welfare	 markets’	 upon	 the	 so-called	 ‘European	 social	 model’.3	 In	 the	
context	of	health	care,	this	analysis	manifests	itself	in	discussions	concerning	the	relative	effect	
of	liberalisation	on	the	nature	of	European	health	care	systems	–	which	have	traditionally	been	
founded	 upon	 principles	 of	 equity	 and	 solidarity.	 To	what	 extent	will	 liberalisation	 dilute,	 or	
even	eradicate,	these	‘social’	principles?	Is	a	movement	towards	establishing	EU	citizens’	rights	
to	 access	 health	 care	 across	 the	 EU	 supportable;	 or,	 as	Newdick	 asks:	 ‘[I]s	 this	 individualistic	
view	of	health	care	rights	mistaken	and	likely	to	damage	the	sense	of	social	solidarity	essential	
to	any	public,	social	welfare	system[?]’.4	Alternatively,	might,	as	Ross	suggests	in	his	analysis	of	
the	BUPA	case,5	the	social	values	associated	with	the	European	social	model	be	reflected	in	EC	
competition	rules,	such	that	market	principles	do	not	 invariably	succeed	 in	trumping	those	of	
solidarity?6	 	 These	 are	 interesting	 and	 important	 questions	 that	 go	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 EU’s	
desired	 value	 base	 in	 the	 context	 of	 health	 care.	 As	 such,	 what	 they	 have	 in	 common	 is	 a	
normative	 focus	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 revolve	 around	 questions	 of	 values	 and	 principles	 and	 the	
striking	of	an	appropriate	balance	between,	or	among,	them.	This	normative	approach	is	neatly	
illustrated	in	Hervey’s	discussion	of	the	European	social	model:	
In	 the	 context	of	health	policy,	 such	 [European	 social	model]	 values	may	 include	equality	of	 access	 to	health	
care	and	the	determinants	of	good	health,	solidarity	in	health	care	financing,	and	regulation	of	economic	activity	
as	 is	 necessary	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 public	 health.	 Promoting	 the	 European	 social	 model	 is	 thus	 a	
fundamentally	 normative	 activity.	 As	 the	 European	 Union	 emerges	 as	 a	 ‘non-state	 post-national	 polity’,	 its	
actions	having	effects	in	ever	increasing	areas	of	economic,	social	and	political	life,	the	issue	of	what	model	of	
social	regulation	is	chosen	within	the	EU’s	legal	order	is	of	crucial	significance	in	terms	of	the	values	that	post-
																																																																		
3
	 See	 E	 Szyszczak,	 ‘Legal	 Tools	 in	 the	 Liberalisation	 of	Welfare	Markets’	 in	 U	Neergaard	 et	 al	 (eds),	 Integrating	
Welfare	Functions	into	EU	Law:	From	Rome	to	Lisbon	(Copenhagen:	DJØF	Publishing,	2009)	279.		
4
	Newdick,	‘Citizenship,	Free	Movement	and	Health	Care’,	op.	cit.,	1645.	
5
	T289/03	British	United	Provident	Association	Ltd	(BUPA)	v.	Commission	of	the	European	Communities	[2005]	ECR	
II-741	(CFI).	
6
	M	Ross,	‘A	Healthy	Approach	to	Services	of	General	Economic	Interest?	The	BUPA	Judgment	of	the	Court	of	First	
Instance’	(2009)	34	European	Law	Review	127.	
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national	polity	seeks	to	uphold.
7
	
While	recognising	the	 importance	of	normative	questions,	 this	article’s	 focus	 is	different.	For,	
rather	than	analysing	what	the	desired	balance	of	values	and	principles	should	be	 in	the	EU’s	
emerging	jurisdiction	in	the	field	of	health	care,	it	considers	the	potential	consequences	of	this	
jurisdiction	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 law,	 medicine,	 politics,	 and	 the	 economy	 in	 the	
context	of	the	welfare	state	–	specifically	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS).	In	order	to	do	so,	it	
takes	the	European	Court	of	Justice’s	(ECJ)	ruling	in	Watts	as	a	case	study.8	There	has,	of	course,	
been	much	commentary	on	the	Watts	case.9	What	this	article	seeks	to	do,	however,	is	to	shift	
the	 analysis	 of	 this	 case	 in	 three	ways.	 First,	 and	 as	 indicated,	 it	moves	 the	 discussion	 away	
from	 normative	 concerns	 to	 focus,	 instead,	 on	 other	 issues	 –	 issues	 revolving	 around	 what	
might	be	called	the	political	and	the	economic	–	that	have	received	much	less	coverage	in	the	
existing	literature.	Secondly,	it	draws	the	analysis	of	the	case	directly	into	the	realm	of	medical	
and	health	care,	rather	than	EU,	law	by	placing	it	within	the	context	of	some	of	the	debates	and	
concerns	that	have	been	central	to	those	working	within	the	sphere	of	medical	and	health	care	
law.	This	is	important	as	the	vast	majority	of	the	analysis	of	Watts	has	been	undertaken	by	EU	
lawyers.	Finally,	and	related	to	this,	 it	deploys	social	 theory	and	analysis	–	specifically,	 Jürgen	
Habermas’s	work	on	juridification	and	Ivan	Illich’s	reflections	on	medicalisation	–	to	advance	a	
novel	way	of	thinking	through	the	Watts	case	and	its	implications	for	the	role	of	law	vis-à-vis	a	
																																																																		
7
	TK	Hervey,	‘Mapping	the	Contours	of	European	Union	Health	Law	and	Policy’	(2002)	8	European	Public	Law	69,	
72.	
8
	R.	(on	the	application	of	Watts)	v.	Bedford	Primary	Care	Trust	and	Another	[2006]	All	ER	(D)	220	(May).	
9
	See,	for	example,	J	Hunt,	‘Citizens’	Rights	to	Receive	Medical	Treatment	in	Another	EU	Member	State’	(2006)	28		
Journal	of	Social	Welfare	&	Family	Law	217;	JV	McHale,	‘Rights	to	Medical	Treatment	in	EU	Law’	(2007)	15	Med.	L.	
Rev.	99;	and	Newdick,	‘Citizenship,	Free	Movement	and	Health	Care’,	op.	cit.	
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number	of	key	issues	around	the	NHS.	The	description	of	the	article’s	structure	that	follows	will	
highlight	some	of	these	points	and	provide	an	indication	of	the	arguments	to	be	advanced.	
The	 article	 begins	 by	 providing	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 notions	 of	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation,	as	developed	in	the	work	of	Jürgen	Habermas	and	Ivan	Illich	respectively.	Those	
notions	will	form	the	framework	through	which	the	implications	of	the	Watts	case	and	the	new	
EU	patients’	rights	Directive	–	adopted	 in	March	201110	–	will	be	explored	 later	 in	the	article.	
Medical	and	health	care	 lawyers	will,	of	course,	be	familiar	with	the	notion	of	medicalisation.	
Conveying	a	general	 sense	of	 the	colonisation	by	medicine	and	medical	professionals	of	non-
medical	 issues	or	problems,	medicalisation,	and	especially	its	critique,	can	be	thought	to	have	
been	foundational	in	the	development	of	medical	and	health	care	law.	It	formed,	and	continues	
to	form,	a	target	for	medical	and	health	care	lawyers	concerned	to	establish	a	legal	system	that	
works	 to	 reverse	 medicine’s	 privilege	 over	 issues	 surrounding	 health	 and	 illness.	 The	 first	
section	of	the	article,	however,	seeks	to	dig	beneath	this	general	idea	of	medicalisation	in	order	
to	 unearth	 some	 of	 its	 specific	 features.	 Focusing	 on	 Illich’s	 work	 on	 the	 ‘expropriation	 of	
health’	 in	the	1970s,	and	what	 is	argued	here	to	be	one	example	of	 its	subsequent	reception	
within	 medical	 law	 (the	 work	 of	 Sheila	 McLean),	 a	 picture	 emerges	 of	 medicalisation	 as	
synonymous	 with	 bureaucracy,	 de-individualisation,	 and	 expropriation.	 The	 power	 of	
individuals	 to	manage	 their	 health	 and	 illness	 is	 supplanted	 by	 the	 bureaucratic	machine	 of	
medicine.	 Medical	 and	 health	 care	 lawyers	 may	 not	 be	 as	 familiar	 with	 the	 other	 notion	
explained	in	the	article’s	first	section	–	namely,	juridification.	Nonetheless,	it	will	be	argued	that	
																																																																		
10
	 Directive	 2011/24/EU	of	 the	 European	Parliament	 and	of	 the	Council	 on	 the	 application	of	 patients’	 rights	 in	
cross-border	healthcare	(9	March	2011).	This	Directive	will	hereafter	be	referred	to	as	‘the	Directive’.	
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there	 are	 parallels	 between	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 juridification	 –	 as	 developed	 in	 Habermas’s	
work	–	and	Illich’s	and	McLean’s	understandings	of	medicalisation.	In	particular,	it	will	become	
clear	 that	 the	 colonisation	 of	 non-legal	 and	 non-medical	 issues	 and	 problems	 by	 law	 and	
medicine,	and	the	theme	of	the	bureaucratic	nature	of	the	welfare	state,	are	common	features	
of	the	juridification	and	medicalisation	described	by	these	authors.	
The	 following	 three	 sections	 set	 out	 the	 substantive	material	 upon	which	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	
penultimate	section	of	the	article	is	based.	Thus,	section	two	provides	an	overview	of	how	the	
NHS	 fits	within	existing	models	of	European	health	 care	 systems.	This	 serves	 to	highlight	 the	
differences	between	‘benefits-in-kind’	(like	the	NHS)	and	‘refund’	systems.	In	particular,	it	helps	
to	 elucidate	 the	 more	 commoditised	 characteristics	 of	 the	 ‘refund’	 system.	 The	 following	
section	sets	out	the	facts	and	rulings	of	the	ECJ	in	the	Watts	case.	In	addition	to	this	descriptive	
purpose,	 the	 section	 also	 identifies	what	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 political	 project	 underlying	 the	
ECJ’s	ruling	 in	the	case.	 It	 is	suggested	that	this	project	–	the	liberalisation	of	access	to	public	
health	 care	 services	within	 the	 EU	 –	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 and	 issues	 that	 are	
inherently	political.	Completing	the	description	of	 the	relevant	 law,	section	 four	of	 the	article	
briefly	describes	and	discusses	the	new	EU	patients’	rights	Directive.	
In	 the	 final	 substantive	 section	of	 the	article	–	 section	 five	–	 the	notions	of	 juridification	and	
medicalisation	 described	 earlier	 are	 used	 to	 think	 through	 the	Watts	 case	 and	 the	Directive,	
and	their	various	implications.	This	analytical	framework	has	two	distinct	advantages.	First,	the	
themes	of	expropriation,	bureaucracy,	and	a	concern	for	individual	freedom	can	be	seen	to	be	
highly	relevant	to	understanding	EU	law	on	patient	mobility	and	its	implications.	For	instance,	
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the	 theme	 of	 expropriation	 can	 help	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 how	 this	 area	 of	 EU	 law	 depoliticises	
important	political	questions	and	issues.	It	also	enables	an	analysis	of	how	the	ruling	in	Watts	
might	affect	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	law	and	politics	that	exists	in	the	context	of	
domestic	cases	involving	challenges	to	the	manner	in	which	scarce	NHS	resources	are	allocated.	
Secondly,	the	importance	of	the	welfare	state	as	a	focal	point	for	those	authors’	discussions	of	
juridification	 and	medicalisation	 facilitates	 engagement	with	 the	broader	 issue	 that	might	 be	
taken	 to	 arise	 from	 Watts	 and	 the	 Directive	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 contemporary	
relationship	between	 liberalisation,	 law,	medicine,	and	 the	welfare	 state.	This	 is,	of	 course,	a	
large	topic	and	no	attempt	is	made	here	to	present	an	exhaustive	analysis	of	it.	The	aim,	rather,	
is	 to	make	 a	 start	 in	 thinking	 about	 this	 broader	 issue	 –	 especially	 the	 structured	 nature	 of	
liberalisation	 and	 markets	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 health	 care	 –	 by	 deploying	 the	 notions	 of	
juridification	and	medicalisation.	In	doing	so,	the	argument	advanced	is	that	the	move	towards	
liberalisation	 and	 marketisation	 disclosed	 in	 EU	 law	 demands	 that	 we	 rethink	 some	 of	 the	
assumptions	 and	 foundations	 underlying	 those	 authors’	 analyses	 of	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation.	 In	 particular,	 the	 relevant	 law	 requires	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 notion	 of	
medicalisation	 as	 developed	 by,	 among	 others,	 Illich	 and	McLean,	 beyond	 a	 concern	 for	 the	
moral-ethical	question	of	the	liberty	of	individuals	vis-à-vis	health	and	illness,	to	incorporate	a	
focus	 on	 the	 relations	 between	 medicine	 and	 economic-related	 questions.	 Given	 the	
importance	 of	medicalisation	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 critical	 analysis	 within	medical	 law	
historically,	expanding	the	understanding	of	this	notion	to	incorporate	such	relations	will	enrich	
our	understanding	of	how	contemporary	law	fits	into	this	picture.		
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Before	commencing,	it	is	important	to	stress	that	the	argument	advanced	in	this	article	is	in	no	
way	intended	to	suggest	that	the	ECJ’s	involvement	in	the	field	of	health	care	is	driven	solely	by	
the	liberal	tendencies	inscribed	in	the	principles	of	the	internal	market.	It	 is	clear	that	the	ECJ	
sometimes	places	limits	on	the	application	of	such	principles	by	stressing	alternative	principles	
(solidarity,	for	instance)	which	are	more	in	keeping	with	the	EU’s	interest	in	paying	due	regard	
to	social	concerns.	As	Ross	has	noted:	‘[W]here	features	of	social	solidarity	are	sufficiently	pre-
dominant	in	a	national	scheme	such	as	social	security,	pensions	or	health	care,	the	Court	[ECJ]	
has	 been	 prepared	 to	 hold	 that	 the	 ‘economic’	 aspect	 is	 displaced’.11	 This	 is	 especially	 true	
where	 competition	 rules	 are	 applied	 by	 the	 ECJ	 to	 health	 care	matters.12	 The	 importance	 of	
acknowledging	Member	States’	power	to	protect	their	national	health	care	systems	has,	as	we	
will	see,	also	been	re-emphasised	in	the	recent	patients’	rights	Directive.	The	objective	here	is	
thus	 neither	 to	 dispute	 this	 nor,	 as	 indicated	 above,	 to	 advance	 suggestions	 as	 to	 how	 the	
balance	between	 the	economic	and	 the	social	might	better	be	 struck	 in	 the	 sphere	of	health	
care	at	the	EU	level.	Rather,	the	purpose,	at	least	in	part,	is,	by	way	primarily	of	an	analysis	of	
Watts,	 to	 think	 through	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 social	 and	 the	 economic	 in	 a	 different	
register	to	that	encountered	in	the	existing	literature,	such	that	the	structures	of	liberalisation	
are	identified	as	 including	social	and	public	institutions	–	here,	crucially,	the	legal	and	medical	
systems,	and	the	NHS.	
II.	 JURIDIFICATION	AND	MEDICALISATION	
																																																																		
11
	M	Ross,	‘The	Value	of	Solidarity	in	European	Public	Services	Law’	in	M	Krajewski	et	al	(eds),	The	Changing	Legal	
Framework	for	Services	of	General	Interest	in	Europe:	Between	Competition	and	Solidarity	(The	Hague:	TMC	Asser	
Press,	 2009)	 81,	 84.	 In	 the	 footnote	 to	 this	 quotation,	 Ross	 cites	 Case	 C-205/03	 P	 FENIN	 [2006]	 ECR	 I-6295	 to	
illustrate	this	point.	
12
	 An	 argument	 that	 can	 be	 found	 in	 E	 Szyszczak,	 ‘Modernising	 Healthcare:	 Pilgrimage	 for	 the	 Holy	 Grail?’	 in	
Krajewski	et	al	(eds),	ibid.	191.	
Page	|	8		
	
Juridification	is	a	notion	that	emerged	in	 legal	and	social	theory	to	describe	different	types	of	
phenomena.	 One	 of	 its	 most	 famous	 exponents	 –	 Jürgen	 Habermas	 –	 has	 described	
juridification	as	follows:	
The	expression	‘juridification’	refers	quite	generally	to	the	tendency	toward	an	increase	in	formal	(or	positive,	
written)	 law	that	can	be	observed	 in	modern	society.	We	can	distinguish	here	between	the	expansion	of	 law,	
that	 is	the	legal	regulation	of	new,	hitherto	informally	regulated	social	matters,	from	the	 increasing	density	of	
law,	 that	 is,	 the	 specialized	 breakdown	 of	 global	 statements	 of	 the	 legally	 relevant	 facts	 into	more	 detailed	
statements.	Otto	Kirchheimer	introduced	the	term	[juridification]	 into	academic	discussion	during	the	Weimar	
Republic.	 At	 that	 time	 he	 had	 in	 mind	 primarily	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 class	 conflict	 through	 collective	
bargaining	law	and	labor	law,	and	in	general	the	juristic	containment	of	social	conflicts	and	political	struggles.
13
	
For	 Habermas,	 then,	 juridification	 has	 two	 features.	 The	 first	 denotes	 the	 widening	 of	 the	
application	of	law	to	cover	areas	previously	regulated	only	informally;	while	the	latter	describes	
the	 process	 whereby	 ‘legal	 norms	 …	 tighten	 their	 hold	 …	 by	 way	 of	 increasingly	 detailed	
normative	standards	…	[T]here	is	an	observable	tendency	for	these	standards	to	become	more	
detailed	 in	 their	 specification	of	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 that	 are	being	 legally	 regulated’.14	
Habermas	explicates	juridification	by	identifying	four	‘juridification	thrusts’	that	have	occurred	
since	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Here,	 only	 the	 last	 of	 these	 –	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 will	 be	
discussed.15	
According	 to	 Habermas,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 can	 ‘be	 understood	 as	 the	
institutionalizing	 in	 legal	 form	 of	 a	 social	 power	 relation	 anchored	 in	 class	 structure.’	 –	
something	that	may	be	illustrated	in,	for	example,	the	emergence	of	collective	bargaining	in	the	
sphere	of	employment	and	 the	 limits	placed	on	 the	working	day.	 The	norms	and	 regulations	
associated	 with	 the	 welfare	 state	 are	 meant	 to	 further	 what	 Habermas	 calls	 ‘freedom-
																																																																		
13
	J	Habermas,	The	Theory	of	Communicative	Action	–	Volume	2:	Lifeworld	and	System	 (Cambridge:	Polity,	1987),	
357.	Reference	omitted.	Emphasis	in	original.	
14
	S	Veitch	et	al,	Jurisprudence:	Themes	and	Concepts	(Abingdon:	Routledge-Cavendish,	2007),	217.	
15
	His	discussion	of	the	other	three	juridification	thrusts	–	the	bourgeois	state,	the	bourgeois	constitutional	state,	
and	the	democratic	constitutional	state	–	can	be	found	at	Habermas	op.	cit.,	358-61.	
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guaranteeing	 juridification’	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 protect	 individuals	 against	 the	
consequences	of	the	operation	of	the	capitalist	economy	by,	for	 instance,	establishing	a	State	
pension	 or	 a	 health	 care	 system	 funded	 from	 the	 public	 purse.	 The	 essence	 of	 Habermas’s	
argument	 here	 is	 that	 the	 ‘freedom-guaranteeing	 juridification’	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 is	
ambivalent,	such	that	it	simultaneously	guarantees	freedom	and	takes	it	away.	He	argues	that	
this	arises	not	as	a	side	effect	of	juridification,	but	‘from	the	form	of	juridification	itself.	It	is	now	
the	very	means	of	 guaranteeing	 freedom	 that	endangers	 the	 freedom	of	 the	beneficiaries’.16	
Thus,	 addressing	 life-risks	 such	 as	 old	 age	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 legal	 entitlement	 to	 a	
monetary	benefit	 individualises	these	risks	by	creating	legal	subjects	who	pursue	their	private	
interests.	Rather	than	guaranteeing	freedom,	Habermas	suggests	that	this	juridification	of	life-
risks	can	result	in	the	opposite,	as	claimants	come	increasingly	to	depend	on	the	interventions	
of	 the	 bureaucratic	 state.	 Importantly,	 this	 system	 of	 individual	 legal	 entitlements	 ‘also	 has	
consequences	 for	 the	 readiness	 of	 solidaric	 communities	 to	 provide	 subsidiary	 assistance’.17	
This	points	more	generally	to	the	social	effects	of	such	juridification.	For,	 in	Habermas’s	view,	
juridification	amounts	to	a	colonisation	of	the	lifeworld	of	those	who	depend	on	the	benefits	of	
the	welfare	state.18	It	impacts	negatively	on	the	communicative	structures	of	the	lifeworld	by,	
amongst	 other	 things,	 failing	 to	 pay	 due	 regard	 to	 the	 social	 conditions	 within	 which	 social	
questions	and	problems	originate:	‘The	situation	to	be	regulated	is	embedded	in	the	context	of	
a	 life	history	and	of	a	concrete	 form	of	 life;	 it	has	 to	be	subjected	 to	violent	abstraction,	not	
																																																																		
16
	Ibid.,	362.	Emphasis	in	original.	
17
	Ibid.	
18
	 Cotterrell	 helpfully	 summarises	 Habermas’s	 concept	 of	 the	 lifeworld	 as	 follows:	 ‘The	 lifeworld	 is	 the	
environment	of	 everyday	 social	 experience	 in	which	 customs,	 cultures,	moral	 ideas	and	popular	understandings	
are	formed	and	reproduced.’	See	R	Cotterrell,	Law,	Culture	and	Society:	Legal	Ideas	in	the	Mirror	of	Social	Theory	
(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2006),	25.	
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merely	 because	 it	 has	 to	 be	 subsumed	 under	 the	 law,	 but	 so	 that	 it	 can	 be	 dealt	 with	
administratively’.19	Ultimately,	this	leads	Habermas	to	note	the:	
dilemmatic	 structure	 of	 this	 type	 of	 juridification	 [which]	 consists	 in	 the	 fact	 that,	 while	 the	 welfare-state	
guarantees	are	intended	to	serve	the	goal	of	social	integration,	they	nevertheless	promote	the	disintegration	of	
life-relations	when	these	are	separated,	through	legalized	social	intervention,	from	the	consensual	mechanisms	
that	coordinate	action	and	are	transferred	over	to	media	such	as	power	and	money.
20
	
It	has	been	noted	that	while	Habermas’s	notion	of	juridification	is	synonymous	with	a	crisis	of	
the	 legal	 system,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 understanding	 of	 the	 phenomenon.21	 For	
juridification	has	also	been	viewed	as	a	political,	rather	than	a	legal,	problem.	Habermas	himself	
draws	attention	to	this	political	understanding	of	juridification	in	the	quotation	at	the	beginning	
of	 this	 section,	where	 he	 refers	 to	 Kirchheimer’s	 use	 of	 juridification	 to	 refer	 to	 ‘the	 juristic	
containment	of	social	conflicts	and	political	struggles’.	Here,	‘political	disputes	or	problems	are	
distorted	 by	 being	 made	 to	 fit	 legal	 categories’	 through	 ‘the	 legal	 system	 appropriating,	 or	
juridifying,	conflicts	that	should	more	properly	be	dealt	with	politically’.22	Mathiesen	sums	up	
the	political	understanding	of	juridification,	and	its	implications,	succinctly	as	follows:	
[J]urisprudence	contains	a	peculiar	potential	to	transform	political	questions	of	conflict	into	apparently	neutral,	
technical	 and	 professional	 questions	 …	 In	 parts	 this	 happens	 by	 the	 jurist’s	 raising	 the	 fundamental	 legal	
question	 of	 whether	 there	 exists	 a	 ‘legal	 authority’	 or	 ‘legal	 basis’	 for	 given	 actions;	 in	 short,	 whether	 the	
actions	are	 legal.	 Thereby	 the	debate	 is	 transformed	 from	being	a	 clearly	political	debate	–	 for	and	against	a	
political	standpoint	–	to	being	an	exchange	of	opinions	concerning	the	apparently	neutral	and	unpolitical	issue	
of	whether	legal	authority	or	basis	‘exists’	…	[T]he	debate	is	‘lifted’	from	the	political	to	the	professional-juridical	
level,	the	professional-juridical	level	being	regarded	as	superordinate	and	therefore	more	‘elevated’.
23
	
Another	way	of	putting	this	would	be	to	say	that	law	depoliticises	conflict.	It	transforms	political	
questions	and	conflicts	 into	questions	of,	and	conflicts	around,	 law,	whether	 in	 the	 form	of	a	
																																																																		
19
	Habermas	op.	cit.,	363.	
20
	Ibid.,	364.	Emphasis	in	original.	
21
	Veitch	et	al,	op.	cit.,	221.	
22
	Ibid.,	222.	
23
	T	Mathiesen,	Silently	Silenced:	Essays	on	the	Creation	of	Acquiescence	in	Modern	Society	(Winchester:	Waterside	
Press,	2004),	17.	
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search	 for	 the	 correct	 legal	 precedent	 or,	 as	Mathiesen	 says,	 the	 appropriate	 legal	 basis	 for	
given	 actions.	 Legalising	 such	 questions	 and	 conflicts	 deprives	 them	of	 their	 political	 quality,	
thereby	diminishing	the	possibility	for	debate	over	fundamental	 issues,	such	as	the	values	we	
wish	to	inform	the	nature	of	our	social	institutions.	To	deploy	Mathiesen’s	phrase,	law	‘silently	
silences’	the	political.	
Rather	 than	 juridification,	 it	 is	medicalisation	 that	 has	 been	 the	 object	 of	 critical	 analysis	 for	
some	medical	 lawyers.	 Indeed,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	 critique	 of	medicalisation	 has	 been	
instrumental	in	giving	rise	to	the	area	of	research	that	has	come	to	be	known	as	medical	 law.	
Like	the	second	–	political	–	form	of	juridification	described	above,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	
essence	 of	 medicalisation	 lies	 in	 the	 conversion	 of	 traditionally	 non-medical	 problems	 and	
issues	–	namely,	health	and	illness	–	into	medical	ones.	In	a	book	that	could	be	considered	to	
have	been	 influential	 in	 inspiring	 the	 critique	of	medicalisation	within	medical	 law,	 Ivan	 Illich	
criticises	 the	 power	 of	 medicine	 in	 modern	 society	 and	 what	 he	 calls	 its	 ‘expropriation	 of	
health’.24	 Medicine,	 he	 argues,	 has	 developed	 a	 monopoly	 over	 health	 care	 and	 deprived	
citizens	 of	 their	 autonomous	 powers	 to	 manage	 their	 health:	 ‘Society	 has	 transferred	 to	
physicians	the	exclusive	right	to	determine	what	constitutes	sickness,	who	is	or	might	become	
sick,	and	what	shall	be	done	to	such	people’.25	This	‘threatens	to	destroy	the	environmental	and	
cultural	 conditions	 needed	 by	 people	 to	 live	 a	 life	 of	 constant	 autonomous	 healing’.26	What	
emerges	as	a	core	feature	of	Illich’s	understanding	of	medicalisation,	then,	is	how	medicine	and	
medical	 professionals	 have	 expropriated	 or	 colonised	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	 care	 for	
																																																																		
24
	 I	 Illich,	 Limits	 to	 Medicine	 –	 Medical	 Nemesis:	 The	 Expropriation	 of	 Health	 (Harmondsworth:	 Penguin,	 1990	
[1976]).	
25
	Ibid.,	13-14.	
26
	Ibid.,	14.	
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themselves	where	health	 is	concerned.	 It	 is	 ‘self-reliance’,	 ‘autonomy’,	 ‘personal	growth’,	and	
‘personal	responsibility’	 in	the	field	of	health	care	that	are	the	casualties	of	medicalisation;	to	
put	it	differently,	a	key	component	of	medicalisation	is	its	de-individualising	quality.	
As	 well	 as	 de-individualisation,	 Illich	 identifies	 the	 decoupling	 of	 medicine	 and	 morality	 as	
another	 feature	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘the	 medicalization	 of	 life’.	 Medical	 ethics	 have	 been	
supplanted	by	the	technical,	scientific	nature	of	medicine	–	a	supposed	value-free	discipline	–	
and	the	courts	and	the	law	have	done	nothing	to	challenge	this:	‘The	courts	and	the	law,	when	
they	 are	 not	 used	 to	 enforce	 the	 Aesculapian	 monopoly,	 are	 turned	 into	 doormen	 of	 the	
hospital	who	select	from	among	the	clients	those	who	can	meet	the	doctors’	criteria’.27	Aligned	
to	 this	 is	 the	 bureaucratic	 nature	 of	 what	 Illich	 defines	 as	 medicalisation.	 Like	 Habermas’s	
theory	 of	 juridification,	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 and	 administrative	 state	 loom	 large	 in	
Illich’s	analysis:	
Medicalization	constitutes	a	prolific	bureaucratic	programme	based	on	the	denial	of	each	man’s	need	to	deal	
with	pain,	sickness,	and	death	…	Suffering,	healing,	and	dying,	which	are	essentially	 intransitive	activities	 that	
culture	 taught	 each	man,	 are	now	 claimed	by	 technocracy	 as	 new	areas	of	 policy-making	 and	 are	 treated	 as	
malfunctions	 from	which	 populations	 ought	 to	 be	 institutionally	 relieved.	 The	 goals	 of	metropolitan	medical	
civilization	are	 thus	 in	opposition	 to	every	single	cultural	health	programme	they	encounter	 in	 the	process	of	
progressive	colonization.
28
	
In	 Habermas’s	 language,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 this	 sort	 of	 medicalisation	 involves	 the	
bureaucratically	 driven	 colonisation	 by	 medicine	 of	 the	 lifeworld	 of	 individuals	 and	 the	
destruction	of	the	cultural	mechanisms	and	conditions	historically	developed	to	cope	with,	and	
manage,	health	and	illness.	
																																																																		
27
	Ibid.,	55-6.	
28
	Ibid.,	137-8.	References	omitted.	
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As	mentioned,	Illich’s	book,	and	the	arguments	about	medicalisation	within	it,	might	be	thought	
to	have	been	influential	in	shaping	some	academic	medical	lawyers’	focus	on	medicalisation	as	
a	 key	 problem	 of,	 and	 for,	 law	 –	 not	 least	 as	 Illich	 envisaged	 the	 recognition	 of	 his	 desired	
return	to	autonomous	action	as	being	optimally	secured	via	 legal	 (and	political)	procedures.29	
Illich’s	 influence	 in	 this	 regard	 can	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 in	 Sheila	 McLean’s	Old	 Law,	 New	
Medicine.30	In	this	book,	McLean	is	critical	of	the	ways	in	which	not	only	‘human	problems	and	
human	 values	 become	medicalised’,	 but	 how	 the	 law	 is	 complicit	 in	 helping	 to	 produce	 this	
state	of	affairs.	Through	its	deference	to	medicine	and	medical	professionals,	McLean	argues,	
law	 sustains	 medicalisation	 and	 disenfranchises	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 result.	 Like	 Illich,	 then,	
McLean	views	medicalisation	as	constituting,	on	the	one	hand,	an	expropriation	by	medicine	of	
human	 values	 and	 problems,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 a	 process	 that	 de-individualises.	 This	 latter	
consequence	 amounts	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 respect	 the	 autonomy	 of	 patients	 and,	 specifically,	 to	
acknowledge	their	 liberty	 to	make	decisions	 regarding	 their	medical	 treatment.	As	with	 Illich,	
McLean’s	critique	of	medicalisation	here	resides	in	the	failure	to	pay	due	regard	to	civil	liberty	–	
that	is,	freedom	from	interference	(in	one’s	body	and	in	the	decisions	one	wishes	to	take	on	the	
basis	 of	 one’s	 personal	 value	 or	 belief	 system).	 In	 short,	 medicalisation	 prevents	 individuals	
being	 left	 alone	 to	 make	 decisions	 about	 medical	 treatment	 which	 will	 subsequently	 be	
respected	by	medical	 professionals.	 Rather	 than	 supporting	 this	 detrimental	 consequence	by	
shoring	up	medicalisation,	McLean	argues	that	law	should,	if	you	like,	initiate	a	process	of	de-
medicalisation	by	deploying	the	language	of	human	rights	to	the	ends	of	recognising	that	illness	
																																																																		
29
	Ibid.,	270-1.	
30
	S	McLean,	Old	Law,	New	Medicine:	Medical	Ethics	and	Human	Rights	(London:	Pandora,	1999).	Further	examples	
of	the	importance	of	medicalisation	as	a	focus	for	critical	analysis	within	medical	law	can	be	found	in	the	work	of	
Ian	Kennedy	(Treat	Me	Right:	Essays	in	Medical	Law	and	Ethics	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1988))	and	Sally	Sheldon	
(Beyond	Control:	Medical	Power	and	Abortion	Law	(London:	Pluto,	1997)).	
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is	 a	 human,	 rather	 than	 a	 medical,	 phenomenon,	 and	 of	 upholding	 individual	 self-
determination.	
What	are	the	key	points	to	be	extracted	from	this	brief	tour	of	juridification	and	medicalisation?	
From	 the	 authors	 discussed	 here,	 these	 phenomena	 share	 two	 principal	 features.	 First,	 they	
capture	processes	of	expropriation	in	which	problems,	issues	and	conflicts	are	torn	from	their	
original	settings	or	conditions	and	made	subject	to	law	and/or	medicine.	Various	consequences	
flow	 from	 such	 processes,	 including	 the	 denial	 of	 freedom;	 the	 disregard	 for	 the	 social	 and	
cultural	conditions	and	relations	of	what	Habermas	calls	the	lifeworld;	and	the	depoliticisation	
of	 fundamental	 political	 issues,	 questions,	 and	 conflicts.	 Secondly,	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation	are	closely	related	to	what	is	taken	to	be	the	bureaucratic	nature	of	the	welfare	
state.	Underlying	 the	analyses	of	 juridification	and	medicalisation	 set	out	here	 is,	 in	effect,	 a	
critique	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 for	 its	 perceived	 technocracy,	 scientism,	 and	 soullessness.	 The	
medicine	and	law	of	the	welfare	state	are	thought	to	function	in	such	a	way	as	to	deprive	the	
individual	 of	 power	 and	 freedom,	 and	 to	 ensure,	 instead,	 the	 efficient	 workings	 of	 an	
overweening	bureaucratic	 state.	For	McLean	and	 Illich,	at	 least,	 law	possesses	 the	ability	and	
characteristics	to	transform	the	negative	aspects	of	medicalisation	and	juridification	into	a	legal	
system	that	promotes	individual	freedom	through	the	discourse	of	rights.	Whereas	Habermas	is	
sceptical	of	the	potential	of	the	legal	entitlements	of	the	welfare	state	to	guarantee	freedom,	
McLean	 and	 Illich	 argue	 that	 rights	 –	 in	 McLean’s	 case	 human	 rights	 –	 constitute	 the	 best	
method	 of	 reversing	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 medicalisation	 and,	 thus,	 of	 recognising	 the	
autonomy,	 personal	 growth	 and	 responsibility	 so	 comprehensively	 effaced	 by	 the	 type	 of	
medicine	and	law	characteristic	of	the	bureaucratic	welfare	state.	
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Later	 in	 the	article,	 the	notions	of	 juridification	and	medicalisation	will	be	deployed	as	 lenses	
through	which	to	comprehend	the	Watts	 ruling,	the	recent	Directive,	and	their	 implications	–	
especially	those	relating	to	the	relationships	between,	on	the	one	hand,	law	and	politics	where	
access	to	health	care	is	concerned,	and,	on	the	other,	the	welfare	state	and	the	market.	First,	
however,	it	is	necessary	to	describe	the	relevant	substantive	material	upon	which	this	analysis	
is	to	be	based.	That	is	the	objective	of	the	following	three	sections.	
III.	 THE	NHS	AND	MODELS	OF	EUROPEAN	HEALTH	CARE	SYSTEMS	
The	NHS	is	a	public,	or	social,	health	care	system,	funded	via	general	taxation.	Like	most	other	
European	 health	 care	 systems,	 its	 scope	 is	 universal	 in	 that	 it	 covers	 the	 entire	 national	
population	 (those	 who	 are	 ‘ordinarily	 resident’	 in	 the	 UK).	 Its	 guiding	 principle,	 frequently	
reiterated	by	UK	Governments,	is	that	access	to	medical	treatment	and	health	care	services	is	
based	 on	 clinical	 need	 and	 not	 the	 ability	 to	 pay.31	 The	 NHS,	 however,	 differs	 in	 important	
respects	 from	 some	 other	 European	 social	 health	 care	 systems.32	 Unlike	 what	 is	 called	 the	
‘insurance’	model,	 in	which	social	health	care	 is	 funded	through	contributions	employees	and	
employers	make	to	specific	insurance	funds,	as	noted	the	NHS	is	directly	financed	by	the	state	
through	 taxation.	 Its	 underlying	 foundation	 is	 thus	 citizenship,	 rather	 than	 participation	 in	 a	
particular	 trade	 or	 profession.33	Moreover	 provision	 of	 health	 care	within	 tax-based	 systems	
																																																																		
31
	For	the	latest	reassertion	of	this	principle,	see	the	current	Coalition	Government’s	White	Paper,	Department	of	
Health,	Equity	and	Excellence:	Liberating	the	NHS	Cm	7881	(London:	The	Stationery	Office,	2010),	3.	
32
	The	following	narrative	detailing	these	differences	relies	on	the	description	of	European	health	care	systems	in	V	
Hatzopoulos,	 ‘Health	 Law	and	Policy:	 The	 Impact	 of	 the	 EU’,	 in	G	de	Búrca	 (ed),	EU	 Law	and	 the	Welfare	 State	
(Oxford:	OUP,	2005),	116-19.	
33
	It	should	be	noted	that	some	authors	have	discussed	the	potential	ramifications	for	the	notion	of	citizenship	of	
the	EU’s	increased	involvement	in	matters	of	health	care.	For	one	such	discussion,	see	E	Szyszczak,	‘Legal	Tools	in	
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like	the	NHS	is	predominantly	public	–	that	is,	it	is	delivered	by	health	care	professionals	directly	
employed	by	the	state.34	This	differs	from	provision	under	‘insurance’	systems,	where,	because	
of	the	variety	of	insurance	funds	in	existence,	both	public	and	private	health	care	providers	are	
routinely	involved	in	delivering	social	health	care.	
A	further,	notable	distinction	exists	in	the	context	of	European	health	care	systems.	This	relates	
to	the	mode	of	receiving	health	care	benefits.	The	NHS	operates	on	the	basis	of	a	‘benefits-in-
kind’	system.	Here,	patients	receive	medical	treatment	from	specific	providers	–	either	public	or	
private	 (the	 latter	 having	 a	 contract	 with	 the	 state	 to	 provide	 social	 health	 care)	 –	 without	
having	to	pay	for	it	up	front.	While	the	cost	of	treatment	delivered	by	public	bodies	is	settled	
directly	 by	 the	 state,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 private	 providers,	 usually	 a	 flat	 annual	 fee	 is	 payable,	
together	 with	 ‘a	 fee	 per	 capita	 of	 patient	 treated,	 plus	 actual	 expenses	 incurred’.35	 As	
Hatzopoulos	notes:	‘In	this	system	the	choice	of	patients	is	more	restricted	...	Healthcare	under	
this	 system	 is	 seen	 more	 as	 a	 public	 good	 to	 which	 access	 should	 be	 ensured	 in	 all	
circumstances	and	 less	as	a	 commodity	or	 good	 for	which	 the	 consumer/patient	may	have	a	
say’.36	The	‘refund’	system,	on	the	other	hand,	offers	patients	greater	choice,	as	they	may	elect	
to	receive	their	treatment	from	any	public	or	private	health	care	provider,	 irrespective	of	the	
cost.	Under	this	system,	patients	initially	pay	for	their	treatment	and	then	claim	reimbursement	
of	it.	In	contrast	to	the	benefits-in-kind	system,	the	extensive	choice	characteristic	of	the	refund	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
the	 Liberalisation	 of	 Welfare	 Markets’,	 op.	 cit.	 282-7.	 While	 interesting,	 this	 article	 will	 not	 engage	 with	 the	
question	of	citizenship.	
34
	Although	a	greater	role	for	private	and	voluntary	providers	of	health	care	within	the	NHS	has	been	created	by	
successive	UK	governments.	For	the	latest	proposals	to	widen	the	range	of	providers	in	England,	see	Department	
of	Health,	op.	cit.	
35
	Hatzopoulos,	op.	cit.,	117.	
36
	Ibid.	
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system	renders	it	more	compatible	with	a	commoditised	understanding	of	health	care,	in	which	
the	 patient	 might	 better	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 consumer	 selecting	 treatment(s)	 from	 a	 variety	 of	
health	care	providers.	
It	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that	 such	 a	 commoditised	 vision	 of	 health	 care	 directly	 contradicts	 the	
founding	principles	of	the	NHS.	As	well	as	making	clinical	need	and	not	the	ability	to	pay	the	key	
determinant	 of	 access	 to	 health	 care	 services,	 at	 its	 inception	 the	NHS	 encapsulated	 a	more	
general	 vision	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 relations.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 this	 was	 apparent	 in	
Beveridge’s	blueprint	for	the	establishment	of	a	welfare	state	within	the	UK.37	There,	guided	by	
the	 objective	 of	 abolishing	what	 he	 termed	 the	 five	 ‘Giant	 Evils’	 of	Want,	 Idleness,	 Squalor,	
Ignorance,	 and	 Disease,	 Beveridge	 noted	 that	 a	 key	 plank	 of	 this	 task	 had	 to	 be	 the	
‘establishment	 of	 comprehensive	 health	 and	 rehabilitation	 services’	 by	 means	 of	 a	 national	
health	service	which	would	provide	to	all	citizens	‘medical	treatment	covering	all	requirements	
...	and	post-medical	rehabilitation	treatment	...	for	all	persons	capable	of	profiting	by	it’.38	This	
health	service	was	to	be	part	of	‘a	new	type	of	human	institution	[State	insurance]’,	the	‘social’	
basis	of	which	 implied	 ‘that	men	stand	 together	with	 their	 fellows’.39	As	 John	Harrington	has	
noted,	 the	architect	of	 the	NHS,	Nye	Bevan,	was	 to	entrench	and	 flesh	out	 this	 vision	of	 the	
UK’s	 new	 health	 care	 system.40	 Not	 only	 was	 health	 care	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 simply	 another	
commodity	 to	be	bought	and	sold;	 it	was	also	designed	 to	be	a	vehicle	 for	 the	promotion	of	
more	 fundamental	 human	 values	 such	 as	 altruism	 and	 solidarity.	 Bevan	 thought	 that	 these	
values	 would	 be	 enhanced	 by,	 for	 instance,	 removing	 doctors	 from	 the	 disciplines	 of	 wage	
																																																																		
37
	See	Sir	William	Beveridge,	Social	Insurance	and	Allied	Services	Cm	6404	(London,	1942).	
38
	Ibid.,	8	and	11.	
39
	Ibid.,	13.	
40
	J	Harrington,	‘Visions	of	Utopia:	Markets,	Medicine	and	the	National	Health	Service’	(2009)	29	L.S.	376,	383-85.	
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labour.	Medical	work	was	to	be	divorced	from	the	pursuit	of	profit	characteristic	of	other	lines	
of	employment,	with	doctors	being	judged	by	the	extent	to	which	they	practised	in	accordance	
with	the	accepted	standards	and	ethics	of	the	medical	profession.	Bevan’s	overriding	purpose	
was	 to	 ensure	 that	 health	 care	 became	 what	 Harrington	 has	 described	 as	 ‘a	 zone	 of	 non-
commodified	human	relations’.	
The	manner	in	which	patients	gain	access	to	public	health	care	services	within	the	UK	reflects	
this	non-commoditised	idea	of	the	NHS	and	its	underlying	values	of	altruism	and	solidarity.	This	
can	be	 seen	 in	 the	 framework	 that	has	emerged	 to	allocate	health	care	 resources	within	 the	
NHS	 in	 conditions	 where	 demand	 for	 access	 to	 treatment	 outstrips	 supply.	 The	 inevitable	
rationing	of	resources	that	this	reality	entails	has	resulted	in	the	operation	of	the	‘waiting	list’	
system,	 whereby,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 assessment	 of	 general	 clinical	 priorities,	 local	 health	
authorities	set	times	within	which	individuals	can	expect	to	receive	treatment	for	their	specific	
illnesses.41	 Rather	 than	 access	 to	medical	 treatment	 being	 determined	 by	 individual	 demand	
and	 choice,	 such	 a	 system	 seeks	 to	 implement	 a	measure	 of	 fairness	 by	 ensuring	 that	 those	
with	 the	most	pressing	clinical	needs	obtain	access	 to	 treatment	 first.	As	Newdick	has	noted,	
this	displays	elements	of	solidarity,	in	the	sense	that	‘the	needs	of	the	individual	are	balanced	
with	 those	 of	 the	 community’.42	 Decisions	 about	 whether	 particular	 individuals	 ought	 to	 be	
given	 access	 to	NHS	 treatment	must	 be	made	 by	 taking	 due	 account	 of	 both	 the	 scarcity	 of	
resources	and	the	needs	of	others.	This	approach	is	supported	by	the	benefits-in-kind	nature	of	
the	 NHS,	 which,	 as	 noted	 above,	 does	 not	 involve	 individuals	 paying	 up	 front	 for	 their	
																																																																		
41
	The	operation	of	waiting	lists	is	not	the	only	means	of	rationing	scarce	health	care	resources.	For	a	discussion	of	
other	mechanisms,	including	rationing	by	denial	and	selection,	see	K	Syrett,	Law,	Legitimacy	and	the	Rationing	of	
Health	Care:	A	Contextual	and	Comparative	Perspective	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2007),	Ch.	3.	
42
	Newdick,	‘Citizenship,	Free	Movement	and	Health	Care’,	op.	cit.,	1652.	
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treatment.	Moreover,	 it	 is	necessary	to	emphasise	the	inherently	political	nature	of	allocating	
scarce	 health	 care	 resources.	 At	 one	 level,	 this	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 the	 national	
government	of	the	day	that	determines	the	annual	budget	of	the	NHS.	How	much	is	devoted	to	
health	 care	 each	 year	 must	 be	 decided	 in	 the	 context	 of	 overall	 government	 spending	 and	
requirements.	 At	 another	 level,	 it	means	 that,	 democratically,	 the	 decision	 as	 to	 how	 scarce	
resources	are	allocated	rests	with	the	Government	and,	more	specifically,	with	those,	such	as	
primary	care	trusts,	with	the	authority	to	make	such	decisions	 in	practice.43	We	will	return	to	
this	political	aspect	of	the	allocation	of	NHS	resources	and,	more	specifically,	the	consequences	
of	EU	law	for	its	relationship	to	law	domestically,	later.	First,	it	is	necessary	to	set	out	the	facts	
of	Watts,	its	holdings,	and	what,	for	the	purposes	of	this	article,	are	its	relevant	points.	
IV.	 R	(ON	THE	APPLICATION	OF	WATTS)	V.	BEDFORD	PRIMARY	CARE	TRUST	
AND	ANOTHER
44
	
In	2006,	 the	ECJ	handed	down	 its	 ruling	 in	 the	Watts	 case.	 The	 case	 involved	a	Mrs.	 Yvonne	
Watts	who	travelled	to	France,	had	a	hip	replacement	operation,	paid	for	it,	and	on	her	return,	
claimed	 to	be	entitled	 to	 reimbursement	 from	NHS	 funds.	Under	EU	 law,	 reimbursement	 for	
hospital	 treatment	 received	 in	 another	 EU	 Member	 State	 is	 possible,	 but	 only	 if	 you	 have	
received	prior	authorisation	 from	your	 local	primary	care	 trust.	While	Mrs.	Watts	had	sought	
such	authorisation,	it	had	been	refused.	Her	claim	for	the	cost	of	the	operation	was	dismissed	
by	the	Secretary	of	State	 for	Health	and	her	subsequent	application	 for	 judicial	 review	of	 the	
																																																																		
43
	It	should	be	noted	that	the	UK’s	Coalition	Government	plans	to	scrap	primary	care	trusts,	their	purchasing	and	
allocative	powers	being	transferred	to	GP	consortia.	See	Department	of	Health,	op.	cit.	
44
	[2006]	All	ER	(D)	220	(May)	
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Secretary	 of	 State’s	 decision	 failed.	 Nonetheless,	 several	 important	 legal	 questions	 revolving	
around	EU	law	arose	in	the	course	of	the	case,	and	these	were	referred	by	the	Court	of	Appeal	
to	the	ECJ	for	preliminary	rulings.	
One	of	the	key	questions	was	this:	Given	the	scarcity	of	NHS	resources,	do	patients	have	a	right	
to	jump	the	waiting	list	queue	by	going	to	another	Member	State	to	obtain	hospital	treatment	
at	the	cost	of	the	NHS;	and,	if	so,	on	what	basis	can	they	exercise	this	right?	The	ECJ	ruled	that	
patients	did	have	such	a	right,	assuming	they	were	enduring	‘undue	delay’	for	their	treatment	
within	 the	 NHS.	 If	 they	 were	 suffering	 undue	 delay,	 then	 the	 local	 primary	 care	 trust	 must	
authorise	treatment	abroad.	But,	how	does	one	determine	whether	or	not	undue	delay	exists?	
The	UK	Government	argued	that	as	long	as	Mrs.	Watts	would	undergo	her	operation	within	the	
NHS	waiting	list	time	for	hip	operations,	there	would	be	no	undue	delay	in	treating	her.	The	ECJ,	
however,	ruled	that	the	measure	of	undue	delay	could	not	simply	be	waiting	list	times	or	the	
argument	of	 limited	NHS	resources.	Rather,	undue	delay	was	to	be	determined	by	way	of	 ‘an	
objective	 medical	 assessment	 of	 the	 patient’s	 medical	 condition,	 the	 history	 and	 probable	
course	of	his	illness,	the	degree	of	pain	he	was	in	and/or	the	nature	of	his	disability	at	the	time	
when	 the	 request	 for	 authorisation	 was	 made	 or	 renewed’.	 So,	 if	 the	 waiting	 time	 for	 an	
operation	on	the	NHS	is	12	months,	but	an	‘objective	medical	assessment’	of	a	patient’s	clinical	
needs	 determines	 that	 this	 exceeds	 an	 acceptable	 waiting	 period	 for	 this	 particular	 patient,	
there	will	be	undue	delay	and	treatment	abroad	must	be	authorised.	As	Mrs.	Watts	had	been	
deemed	by	the	domestic	court	at	first	instance	not	to	have	suffered	undue	delay,	she	was	not	
entitled	to	recover	the	cost	of	her	hip	operation.	
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Watts	also	confirmed	that	A49	of	the	EC	Treaty	(now	A56	TFEU)	on	freedom	to	provide	(and,	by	
extension,	 to	 receive)	 services	 extended	 to	 health	 care	 services	 and	 covered	 the	 NHS.	 This	
added	 a	 further	 legal	 route	 for	 patients	 wishing	 to	 obtain	 hospital	 treatment	 abroad	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 the	 NHS.	 Previously,	 the	 only	 avenue	 lay	 under	 A22	 of	 Council	 Regulation	 (EEC)	
1408/71.	Assuming	 the	 treatment	 sought	 abroad	 is	 one	of	 the	benefits	provided	by	 the	NHS	
and	 that	 the	 patient	 cannot	 receive	 this	 treatment	 via	 the	 NHS	 ‘within	 the	 time	 normally	
necessary	 for	 obtaining	 the	 treatment	 in	 question	 [in	 the	NHS]	 taking	 account	 of	 his	 current	
state	of	health	and	the	probable	course	of	his	disease’,	A22	obliges	the	patient’s	local	primary	
care	trust	to	authorise	the	treatment	abroad.	Here,	the	treatment	must	be	state-provided	and	
its	costs	are	settled	directly	between	the	home	and	host	Member	States.	The	application	of	A49	
[A56	 TFEU]	 in	 this	 context	 broadens	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 the	 right	 to	 obtain	 hospital	 treatment	
elsewhere	 in	 the	EU	by	making	 it	 an	 aspect	of	 the	 general	 freedom	 to	provide	 (and	 receive)	
services.	Assuming	 the	patient	 is	 suffering	 ‘undue	delay’	 (defined	above)	within	 the	NHS,	 the	
local	primary	care	trust	must	authorise	the	request	for	treatment	to	be	obtained	abroad.	Under	
A49	[A56	TFEU],	patients	may	choose	to	obtain	their	hospital	treatment	from	any	foreign	health	
care	 provider	 (whether	 state	 or	 private).	 The	 patient	 pays	 the	 overseas	 provider	 for	 the	
treatment	 up	 front	 and	 then	 claims	 reimbursement	 of	 the	 cost	 from	 the	 NHS.	 The	 amount	
recovered	may	not	exceed	the	cost	of	the	treatment,	had	it	been	performed	within	the	NHS.	
The	three	arguments	advanced	by	the	UK	Government	in	Watts	provide	a	route	into	the	types	
of	 issues	 with	 which	 this	 article	 is	 concerned.45	 The	 first	 argument	 was	 that	 allowing	 NHS	
																																																																		
45
	 The	UK,	 along	with	 the	 Irish,	 Government	 had	made	 these	 arguments,	 or	 representations,	 in	 an	 earlier	 case	
called	Case	C-385/99	Muller-Fauré	and	Van	Riet	v.	Onderluige	Waarborginaatschappij	[2003]	ECR	I-4503	
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patients	 to	 travel	 to	 another	 Member	 State	 to	 receive	 hospital	 treatment	 earlier	 than	 they	
would	 obtain	 it	 on	 the	 NHS	would	 adversely	 affect	 the	manner	 in	 which	 scarce	 health	 care	
resources	were	allocated	within	the	NHS	–	that	is,	through	the	waiting	list	system.	This	would	
risk	 causing	 financial	 imbalance	within	 the	NHS,	 as	 refunding	patients	who	had	been	 treated	
abroad	would	reduce	the	resources	available	 for	those	 in	need	of	urgent	treatment	at	home,	
thereby	 compromising	 the	 NHS’s	 ability	 to	 fulfil	 its	 role	 as	 a	 provider	 of	 adequate	 levels	 of	
health	care.	The	Secretary	of	State	argued	that	waiting	lists	should	be	the	appropriate	measure	
of	whether	patients	would	suffer	undue	delay	in	being	treated,	as	these	waiting	times	and	the	
priorities	 inherent	 in	them	were	already	based	on	clinical	 judgments	about	medical	need	and	
priorities.	 If	patients	were	able	to	travel	to	another	Member	State	to	receive	treatment	early,	
these	judgments	would	be	rendered	ineffective.	
Secondly,	the	Secretary	of	State	contended	that	uncertainty	would	be	created	for	the	NHS	by	
the	impossibility	of	predicting	both	how	many	patients	would	seek	treatment	abroad	and	how	
many	from	abroad	would	travel	to	the	UK	for	treatment.	The	impact	of	 liberalisation	on	each	
UK	 hospital	 would	 no	 doubt	 differ,	 causing	 problems	 in	 allocating	 resources.	 Finally,	 the	
Secretary	of	State	argued	that,	owing	to	the	specific	nature	of	the	NHS	–	including	the	fact	that	
it	 operated	 a	 benefits-in-kind	 system	 and	 was	 a	 non-profit-making	 body	 –	 it	 could	 not	 be	
deemed	 to	 constitute	 a	 ‘service’	 under	 Article	 50	 of	 the	 EC	 Treaty	 (now	 A57	 TFEU),	 as	 its	
services	were	 not	 ‘provided	 for	 remuneration’.	 Consequently,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	
freedom	to	provide	(and	receive)	services	provision	 in	Article	49	of	the	EC	Treaty	[A56	TFEU].	
This	contrasted	with	the	health	care	systems	of	some	other	EU	Member	States,	such	as	France	
(where	 Mrs.	 Watts	 received	 her	 treatment),	 which	 display	 the	 necessary	 element	 of	
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remuneration	in	the	form	of	the	refund	system	described	earlier	(patients	paying	for	treatment	
up	front	and	claiming	reimbursement	of	the	costs).	
What	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 arguments	 point	 to	 is	 not	 only	 a	 defence	 of	 the	 non-
commoditised,	collective	nature	of	the	NHS	based	on	waiting	lists,	but	also	an	assertion	of	the	
political	right	of	Member	States	 legitimately	to	determine	the	characteristics	of	their	national	
health	services	and	not	have	the	principles	upon	which	these	are	based	undermined.	Thus,	 in	
accordance	with	this	understanding	of	the	NHS,	the	role	of	doctors	and	their	clinical	judgments	
of	medical	 priorities	 have	 a	 collective	 objective,	which	 is	 directed	 at	 allocating	 scarce	 health	
care	 resources	 in	a	manner	 fairest	 to	 the	community.	Waiting	 lists	are	 the	outcome	of	 these	
clinical	judgments	and	ought,	in	the	Secretary	of	State’s	view,	to	act	as	the	measure	of	whether	
patients	suffer	undue	delay	within	the	NHS.	Moreover,	the	idea	of	paying	for	medical	treatment	
up	front	and	having	to	claim	it	back	–	as	is	the	case	under	the	‘refund’	system	–	is	alien	to	the	
NHS,	its	absence	resulting	from	a	political	determination	to	preserve	the	founding	principle	of	
the	NHS	that	access	to	treatment	is	based	upon	clinical	need	rather	than	the	ability	to	pay.	
The	 response	 of	 the	 ECJ	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 arguments	 directly	 challenges	 both	 the	
principles	 of	 the	 NHS	 and	 the	 political	 claim	 to	 legitimacy	 underlying	 those	 arguments.	 For	
while	the	ECJ	stressed	in	 its	ruling	that	 its	 interpretation	of	the	relevant	EU	law	did	not	mean	
that	 budgetary	 considerations	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 NHS	 waiting	 lists	 were	 irrelevant	 when	
determining	 a	 Member	 State’s	 obligation	 to	 reimburse	 the	 costs	 of	 a	 patient’s	 hospital	
treatment	abroad,	such	considerations	are	subordinate	in	its	judgment	to	the	fundamental	role	
played	by	objective	assessments	of	patients’	 individual	medical	conditions.	Thus,	at	one	point	
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the	ECJ	speaks	of	‘the	national	competent	authorities’	power	to	manage	the	available	hospital	
capacity	 in	 their	 territory	 by	 the	 use	 of	waiting	 lists	 [not	 being	 undermined	 by	 the	 ruling	 in	
Watts],	provided	 that	 the	existence	of	 such	 lists	does	not	prevent	 the	 taking	account	 in	each	
individual	 case	 of	 the	medical	 circumstances	 and	 the	 clinical	 needs	 of	 the	 person	 concerned	
when	he	requests	authorisation	to	receive	hospital	treatment	in	another	Member	State	at	the	
expense	of	 the	system	with	which	he	 is	 registered’.46	 In	other	words,	EU	 law	will	be	 liable	 to	
undermine	this	 ‘power	to	manage	the	available	hospital	capacity’	should	the	clinical	needs	of	
individual	 patients	 not	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 The	 recognition	 by	 the	 ECJ	 of	 the	 ‘overriding	
national	objectives	relating	to	management	of	the	available	hospital	capacity,	control	of	health	
expenditure	and	financial	balance	of	social	security	systems’	is	thus	not,	as	it	claims,	balanced	
against	 ‘the	 objective	 of	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 patients’	 but	 dependent	 on	 the	 national	
authority	 providing	 for	 the	 latter	 by	 ensuring	 objective	 medical	 assessments	 of	 individual	
patients	are	conducted.	Moreover,	the	Secretary	of	State’s	contention	that	the	NHS	did	not	fall	
within	the	meaning	of	a	‘service’	under	Article	50	of	the	EC	Treaty	[A57	TFEU],	meaning	Article	
49	[A56	TFEU]	did	not	apply,	was	evaded	by	the	ECJ,	as	it	said	there	was	no	need	to	determine	
whether	or	not	this	was	the	case.	Article	49	[A56	TFEU]	applied	where	a	person	whose	state	of	
health	necessitated	hospital	treatment	went	to	another	Member	State	and	there	received	such	
treatment	 for	 consideration;	 in	 this	 context,	 the	 resolution	of	 the	 ‘service’	 status	of	 the	NHS	
was	superfluous.	The	NHS	was	therefore	subject	to	A49	of	the	EC	Treaty	[A56	TFEU].	
These	rulings	challenge	the	underlying	nature	and	values	of	the	NHS	inherent	in	the	Secretary	
of	 State’s	 arguments.	One	obvious	 example	of	 this	 lies	 in	 the	potential	 of	 the	 ECJ’s	 ruling	 to	
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	[2006]	All	ER	(D)	220	(May),	para.	75.	Emphasis	added.	
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defeat	the	planning	aspect	of	the	NHS	and	 its	collective	goal	of	ensuring	fairness	of	access	to	
medical	 treatment	amongst	members	of	 the	national	population	via	 the	operation	of	waiting	
lists.	As	noted	above,	this	is	because	findings	of	undue	delay	may	result	in	those	patients	who	
require	 urgent	 hospital	 treatment	 having	 to	wait	 longer	 for	 it,	 as	 the	 resources	 assigned	 for	
their	 treatment	 are	 used,	 instead,	 to	 reimburse	 less	 urgent	 cases	 which	 have	 received	
authorisation	to	be	treated	elsewhere	in	the	EU.	This	results,	at	least	partially,	from	what	might	
be	called	the	individualisation	of	clinical	judgment	that	plays	such	an	important	part	in	the	ECJ’s	
ruling.	For	while	clinical	judgment	in	the	context	of	scarce	NHS	resources	functions	as	a	way	of	
determining	 the	 timing	of	access	 to	 treatment	domestically,	based	upon	a	 system	of	medical	
priorities	 at	 a	 macro	 level	 (through	 the	 construction	 of	 waiting	 lists),	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
accessing	 treatment	within	 the	 EU,	 the	 ECJ	 demands	 that	 clinical	 judgment	 focus,	 rather,	 on	
each	 individual	patient	 and	his	or	her	medical	 condition	and	 surrounding	 circumstances.	 This	
individualisation	of	clinical	judgment	has	the	potential	to	upset	the	planning	decisions	reflected	
in	waiting	lists	and	to	divert	scarce	resources	away	from	those	who	have	a	more	urgent	need,	
but,	for	whatever	reason,	have	not	sought	prior	authorisation	for	treatment	abroad.	
But	as	well	as	being	at	odds	with	the	Secretary	of	State’s	arguments	regarding	the	NHS’s	nature	
and	guiding	values,	 the	 rulings	 in	Watts	have	 implications	at	what	might	be	described	as	 the	
political	 level.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 these	 implications	 flow	 from	 a	 concrete	 political	 project	
emerging	at	the	EU	level	to	ensure	what,	as	noted	earlier,	Szyszczak	calls	‘the	liberalisation	of	
public	welfare	markets’.	It	is	important	to	re-emphasise	that	the	ECJ’s	rulings	across	the	field	of	
health	 care	 do	 not	 point	 invariably	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 establishing	 a	 blanket	 liberalisation	 of	
health	 care	 services	 policy	 within	 the	 EU.	 Nevertheless,	Watts	 and	 other	 cases	 on	 patient	
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mobility	do	provide	evidence	of	the	ECJ’s	desire	to	promote	liberalisation	and	the	development	
of	the	internal	market	in	the	sphere	of	health	care.	As	such,	it	is	important	to	analyse	how	this	
project	 is	being	established	 through	EU	 law	and	 the	 types	of	 consequences	accompanying	 it.	
This	 analysis	 will	 take	 place	 in	 the	 penultimate	 section	 of	 this	 article	 and	will	 be	 conducted	
through	the	analytical	framework	of	juridification	and	medicalisation	set	out	earlier.	It	is	worth,	
however,	briefly	laying	some	of	the	groundwork	for	this	analysis	here.	
One	 way	 into	 understanding	 this	 political	 project,	 and	 the	 framework	 being	 constructed	 to	
facilitate	its	realisation,	is	to	consider	it	in	terms	of	the	flow	of	NHS	resources.	At	the	Court	of	
Appeal	stage	in	Watts,	May	LJ	made	the	following	observation:	
[I]t	 is	not	 immediately	clear	why	a	state-funded	national	health	service	should	be	required	to	fund	those	who	
provide	 medical	 services	 privately	 in	 other	 member	 states;	 nor	 why	 it	 should	 be	 required	 to	 do	 so	 at	 the	
expense	of	those	who	provide	medical	services	privately	within	its	own	state.	Nor	is	it	comfortable	to	derive	a	
potential	obligation	on	a	member	state	to	provide	larger	resources	to	a	publicly	funded	national	health	service	
from	a	principle	designed	to	protect	commercial	service	providers	in	other	member	states.
47
	
As	noted	earlier,	different	types	of	social	health	care	system	exist	across	the	EU.	While	the	NHS	
can	 be	 thought	 to	 display	 strong	 ‘public’	 characteristics,	 other	 systems,	 such	 as	 France,	 are	
more	‘private’	in	nature,	as	patients	can	elect	to	receive	treatment	from	a	public	or	commercial	
health	care	provider	and	pay	up	 front	 for	 their	 treatment	 (later	seeking	 reimbursement	 from	
the	relevant	 insurer).	A	crucial	distinction	that	May	LJ	alludes	to	 lies	 in	the	absence	of	a	right	
within	the	NHS	to	be	treated	by	a	private	health	care	provider	at	public	expense.	If	this	is	not	
available	to	patients	within	the	NHS,	 then	why,	May	LJ	asks,	should	 it	be	so	abroad,	with	the	
consequence	 that	 NHS	 resources	 are	 diverted	 to	 support	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	
elsewhere	 in	 the	 EU?	Moreover,	May	 LJ	 queries	 why	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 such	 providers	 in	
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	R.	(on	the	application	of	Watts)	v.	Secretary	of	State	for	Health	[2004]	All	ER	(D)	349	(Feb),	para.	103.	
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other	Member	 States	 should	 act	 as	 the	 source	of	 an	obligation	upon	 the	UK	Government	 to	
plough	further	money	into	the	NHS	to	plug	the	gap	created	by	this	diversion	of	resources.	
These	questions	are	not	answered	by	the	ECJ	in	its	ruling;	rather,	its	response	is	simply	to	apply	
EU	 law	with	 the	 objective	 of	 developing	 the	 EU	 internal	 market	 and	 the	 free	movement	 of	
services.	 Irrespective	of	 the	nature	of	 the	health	care	provider	 (public/private),	patients	must	
be	able	 to	 travel	 to	other	EU	Member	States	 to	receive	hospital	 treatment	at	a	point	 in	 time	
when	 they	 should,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 objective	 medical	 assessment,	 have	 been	 entitled	 to	
obtain	 it	at	home.	And	 irrespective	of	 the	makeup	of	 individual	Member	States’	 social	health	
care	 systems	 (taxation/insurance;	 benefits-in-kind/refund),	 each	 one	 must	 reimburse	 such	
hospital	 treatment.	 Otherwise,	 the	 internal	 market	 will	 not	 work.	 The	 upshot	 is	 that,	 even	
though	NHS	 resources	 do	 not	 support	 private	 health	 care	 providers	 of	 hospital	 treatment	 at	
home	 by	 means	 of	 a	 patient	 entitlement	 to	 utilise	 their	 services,	 after	 Watts,	 they	 must	
nevertheless	 support	 them	 abroad.	 That	 is	 a	 fundamental	 condition	 of	 the	 liberalisation	 of	
hospital	care	services	within	the	EU.	As	well	as	patients,	national	resources,	funded	in	the	case	
of	the	NHS	from	general	taxation,	must	be	free	to	flow	across	national	borders	within	the	EU	–	
assuming	the	conditions	surrounding	‘undue	delay’	have	been	satisfied.	
What	emerges	here	 is	how	this	political	project	of	 liberalising	access	to	hospital	care	services	
gives	rise	to	inherently	political	questions	and	issues,	including	the	following:	Should	taxpayers’	
money	be	diverted	to	support	commercial	health	care	providers	in	other	EU	Member	States?	Is	
this	in	the	public	interest?	Is	the	impact	of	the	Watts	ruling	upon	the	core	principles	underlying	
the	NHS	supportable?	Given	 that	 the	ECJ	makes	 the	 recognition	of	Member	States’	power	 to	
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manage	their	hospital	capacity	through	the	use	of	waiting	lists	dependent	on	the	existence	of	a	
system	of	assessment	of	individual,	as	opposed	to	collective,	clinical	need,	does	this	not	amount	
to	a	direct	challenge	to	the	political	legitimacy	of	the	Government,	and	primary	care	trusts,	to	
determine	the	direction	in	which	the	scarce	health	care	resources	of	the	NHS	flow?48	These	are	
questions	 that	give	 rise	 to	 conflicts	 and	debates	over	 the	 shape	our	 societies	and	 its	welfare	
institutions	 should	 take	 –	 conflicts	 and	 debates	 one	 might	 assume	 would	 be	 managed	 and	
conducted	not	only	by	the	political	institutions	of	Member	States,	but	especially	by	those	who	
pay	their	taxes.	These	questions	and	issues	should,	thus,	be	viewed	as	properly	political	ones.	In	
order	 to	 think	 through	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 ruling	 in	Watts	 on,	 inter	 alia,	 how	 these	 types	 of	
political	 questions	and	 issues	are	managed	by	 law,	 the	 relationship	between	 law	and	politics	
where	 NHS	 resources	 are	 allocated	 in	 domestic	 cases,	 and	 the	 broader	 role	 of	 the	
contemporary	 welfare	 state	 vis-à-vis	 the	 market,	 recourse	 will	 be	 had	 to	 the	 notions	 of	
juridification	and	medicalisation	described	earlier.	However,	before	this,	 it	 is	necessary	briefly	
to	explain	the	provisions	of	the	recently	adopted	EU	patients’	rights	Directive	that	are	relevant	
to	this	article	and	to	consider	what	effect,	if	any,	they	have	had	on	the	ECJ’s	ruling	in	Watts.49	
V.	 THE	EU	PATIENTS’	RIGHTS	DIRECTIVE
50
	
The	first	point	to	note	about	the	Directive	is	its	legal	basis	–	A114	TFEU.	The	use	of	this	Article,	
the	purpose	of	which	is	to	facilitate	the	harmonisation	of	laws	in	pursuit	of	the	development	of	
																																																																		
48
	As	the	ECJ	stated,	there	is	a	‘need	for	the	Member	States	to	reconcile	the	principles	and	broad	scheme	of	their	
healthcare	system	with	the	requirements	arising	from	the	Community	freedoms	[here,	 ‘the	objective	of	the	free	
movement	of	patients’]…’.	[2006]	All	ER	(D)	220	(May),	para.	122.	
49
	 For	 a	 fuller	 analysis	 of	 the	 Directive,	 see	 W	 Sauter,	 ‘Harmonisation	 in	 Healthcare:	 the	 EU	 Patients’	 Rights	
Directive’	TILEC	Discussion	Paper	No.	2011-030	(2011).	
50
	 Directive	 2011/24/EU	of	 the	 European	Parliament	 and	of	 the	Council	 on	 the	 application	of	 patients’	 rights	 in	
cross-border	healthcare	(9	March	2011).	
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the	internal	market,	demonstrates	that	the	objective	of	many	of	the	Directive’s	provisions	is	‘to	
improve	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	and	the	free	movement	of	goods,	persons	and	
services’.51	To	that	end,	A1(1)	states	that	the	Directive	‘provides	rules	for	facilitating	the	access	
to	 safe	 and	 high-quality	 cross-border	 healthcare	 and	 promotes	 cooperation	 on	 healthcare	
between	Member	States,	 in	full	respect	of	national	competencies	 in	organising	and	delivering	
healthcare.’	These	rules	are	to	be	in	accordance	with	the	principles	established	by	the	ECJ	in	the	
‘patient	mobility’	cases,	including	Watts.	Thus,	the	Directive	may	be	seen	as	a	codifying	piece	of	
legislation	 that	 gathers	 together	 the	 ECJ	 principles	 developed	 in	 those	 cases	 and	 expresses	
them	in	a	way	that	is	both	more	general	and	leads	to	their	enhanced	practical	implementation.	
The	consequence	of	this	codifying	objective	is	that	much	of	the	Directive	merely	reiterates	the	
principles	established	by	the	ECJ	 in	Watts	 (and	other	cases)	and	which	were	set	out	earlier	 in	
this	article.	Thus,	the	Directive	highlights	the	ECJ’s	consistent	protection	of	the	right	of	Member	
States	 to	 limit	 the	 reimbursement	 of	 cross-border	 healthcare	 –	 and	 therefore	 restrict	 the	
freedom	of	movement	provisions	of	 the	Treaties	–	 for	a	variety	of	 reasons,	amongst	which	 is	
the	 ground	 of	 ‘overriding	 reasons	 of	 general	 interest’.	 Such	 reasons	 include	 planning	
requirements	 relating	 to	 the	 aim	 of	 ensuring	 sufficient	 and	 permanent	 access	 to	 a	 balanced	
range	of	high-quality	 treatment	 in	 the	 relevant	Member	State	or	 to	 the	wish	 to	control	costs	
and	avoid,	as	far	as	possible,	any	waste	of	financial,	technical	and	human	resources.	They	also	
include	the	objective	of	maintaining	a	balanced	and	medical	hospital	service	open	to	all	in	so	far	
as	 it	contributes	to	the	attainment	of	a	high	 level	of	health	promotion.	Sauter	notes	how	the	
Directive	 has,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 ECJ	 cases	 on	 patient	 mobility,	 placed	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	
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	Preamble	of	the	Directive,	recital	2.	
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planning	exception	for	Member	States	of	affiliation	(that	is,	the	home	Member	States	of	those	
seeking	to	obtain	treatment	abroad)	than	the	original	proposal	for	a	Directive	drawn	up	by	the	
Commission.52	 Moreover,	 the	 Directive	 extends	 the	 application	 of	 this	 exception	 to	 cover	
Member	States	of	treatment.53	
It	is	necessary,	however,	to	be	careful	not	to	over-emphasise	the	role	of	the	planning	exception	
in	the	context	of	the	Directive.	One	reason	for	this	 is	that	the	exception	operates	to	 limit	the	
reimbursement	 of	 cross-border	 healthcare	 and,	 thereby,	 restrict	 the	 freedom	 of	 movement	
provisions	 in	 the	 Treaties	 –	 not	 to	 avoid	 them	 completely.	 As	 noted,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	
Directive	is	to	set	out	rules	by	which	to	improve	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	and	the	
free	movement	 of	 goods,	 persons	 and	 services,	 rather	 than	 to	 create	mechanisms	 by	which	
Member	States	can	circumvent	these.	As	the	Directive’s	Preamble	makes	clear:	 ‘As	confirmed	
by	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 neither	 its	 special	 nature	 nor	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 is	 organised	 or	
financed	 removes	healthcare	 from	 the	ambit	of	 the	 fundamental	principle	of	 the	 freedom	to	
provide	services’.54	Moreover,	the	main	method	of	seeking	to	limit	the	reimbursement	of	cross-
border	 healthcare	 envisaged	 by	 the	 Directive	 –	 prior	 authorisation	 –	 creates	 difficulties	 for	
Member	States	of	affiliation	who	seek	to	rely	on	the	planning	exception.	Again,	one	needs	to	
begin	here	with	 the	purpose	of	 the	provisions	 relating	 to	prior	authorisation	 in	 the	Directive,	
which	is	not,	as	may	have	been	thought,	to	shield	Member	States	of	affiliation	from	the	Treaty	
freedoms,	but	to	ensure	their	facilitation:	‘The	sole	objective	of	the	provisions	regarding	prior	
authorisation	and	reimbursement	of	healthcare	provided	 in	another	Member	State	should	be	
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	Sauter,	op	cit.	
53
	See	A4(3).	
54
	Preamble	of	the	Directive,	recital	11.	
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to	 enable	 freedom	 to	provide	healthcare	 for	 patients	 and	 to	 remove	unjustified	obstacles	 to	
that	fundamental	freedom	within	the	patient’s	Member	State	of	affiliation’.55	 Indeed,	as	prior	
authorisation	has	been	deemed	by	the	ECJ	to	constitute	a	restriction	to	the	free	movement	of	
services,	 the	 general	 rule	 is	 that	 Member	 States	 of	 affiliation	 should	 not	 make	 the	
reimbursement	of	the	costs	of	health	care	received	in	another	Member	State	subject	to	prior	
authorisation,	 where	 these	 costs	 would	 have	 borne	 by	 the	 national	 health	 system,	 had	 the	
treatment	been	received	within	the	Member	State	of	affiliation.	
Where	a	system	of	prior	authorisation	is	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	planning	exception	and	in	
place,	 the	 foundation	 for	 its	operation	–	 that	 is,	 the	grant	and	refusal	of	 this	authorisation	 in	
specific	cases	–	does	not	reside	in	the	‘overriding	reasons	of	general	interest’	criterion.	Rather,	
the	 criteria	 shift	 to	 become	 much	 more	 focused	 on	 medical	 and	 healthcare	 outcomes	 and	
implications,	 together	 with	 the	 timing	 of	 treatment.56	 Three	 of	 the	 criteria	 revolve	 around	
concerns	about	the	safety	either	of	 individual	patients	or	the	general	public	as	a	result	of	the	
requested	cross-border	health	care.	The	final	criterion,	and	the	key	one	for	the	purpose	of	the	
Directive,	is	the	more	familiar	condition	relating	to	undue	delay	–	can	the	health	care	sought	be	
provided	within	the	health	system	of	the	Member	State	of	affiliation	within	a	time	limit	which	is	
medically	 justifiable,	 based	 on	 an	 objective	 medical	 assessment	 of	 the	 patient’s	 medical	
condition,	the	history	and	probable	course	of	the	patient’s	 illness,	the	degree	of	the	patient’s	
pain	and/or	the	nature	of	the	patient’s	disability	at	the	time	when	the	request	for	authorisation	
was	made	or	renewed?57	 If	not,	authorisation	for	the	treatment	to	take	place	 in	the	Member	
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	Ibid.,	recital	35.	
56
	The	criteria	for	refusing	to	grant	prior	authorisation	are	set	out	in	A8(6).	
57
	A8(5).	
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State	 of	 treatment	must,	 in	 principle,	 be	 granted	 –	 unless	 any	 of	 the	 safety-risk	 criteria	 just	
mentioned	 are	 satisfied.	 It	 is	 clear,	 then,	 that	 determinations	 regarding	 the	 refusal	 of	 prior	
authorisation	have	the	same	basis	in	the	Directive	as	they	do	in	the	ruling	of	the	ECJ	in	Watts	–	
namely,	an	objective	medical	assessment	of	individual	patients;	or	what	was	referred	to	earlier	
in	 this	 article	 as	 ‘the	 individualisation	 of	 clinical	 judgment’.	 The	 Directive	makes	 this	 doubly	
clear	 for	 health	 systems	 such	 as	 the	NHS	when	 it	 reiterates	 in	 its	 Preamble	 the	 point	 about	
waiting	 lists	made	by	 the	ECJ	 in	Watts	 –	 that	 is,	 that	 the	 refusal	 to	 grant	prior	 authorisation	
‘may	not	be	based	on	the	ground	that	there	are	waiting	lists	on	national	territory	intended	to	
enable	the	supply	of	hospital	care	to	be	planned	and	managed	on	the	basis	of	predetermined	
general	clinical	priorities,	without	carrying	out	an	objective	medical	assessment’.58	The	result	is	
that,	unlike	the	establishment	of	a	system	of	prior	authorisation	–	which	may	be	based	on	the	
planning	exception	via	‘overriding	reasons	of	general	interest’	(the	grounds	of	which,	as	Sauter	
notes,	 have	 been	 generously	 extended	 in	 the	 Directive)	 –	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 grant	 and	
refusal	 of	 prior	 authorisation	 must	 be	 based	 on	 medical	 criteria	 and	 judgments	 focused	
predominantly	 on	 the	 individual.	 This	 is	 important	 as	 it	 is	 at	 this	 grant/refusal	 stage	 of	 prior	
authorisation	that	the	flow	of	health	care	resources	abroad	and	the	effective	 implementation	
of	 the	 free	 movement	 rules	 are	 determined.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 at	 the	 very	 moment	 the	
Member	State	of	affiliation,	which	does	not	wish	to	divert	 its	scarce	health	care	resources	 to	
health	 care	providers	 abroad,	might	wish	 to	 raise	 the	planning	exception	 to	prevent	 such	an	
eventuality,	 it	 is	 prevented	 from	doing	 so,	 as	 the	decision	 is	 passed	over	 to	members	of	 the	
medical	profession	and	individualised.	
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	Preamble	of	the	Directive,	recital	43.	
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Insofar	as	the	validity	of	the	key	aspects	of	the	Watts	ruling	described	earlier	is	concerned,	the	
Directive	 has	 little	 effect.	 For,	 while	 it	 gives	 more	 prominence	 and	 scope	 to	 the	 planning	
exception	as	a	determinant	of	the	need	to	establish	a	system	of	prior	authorisation,	it	leaves	in	
place	 the	medicalised	and	 individualised	nature	of	 the	criteria	used	 to	determine	whether	or	
not	 prior	 authorisation	 is,	 in	 fact,	 to	 be	 granted.	 Crucially,	 it	 also	 confirms	 that,	 like	 A49	 EC	
Treaty	[A56	TFEU],	the	Directive	will	apply	to	cross-border	health	care	provided	by	private,	as	
well	 as	 public,	 health	 care	 providers.59	 Moreover,	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	
administrative	 procedures	 are	 in	 place	 for	managing	 the	 use	 of	 cross-border	 healthcare	 and	
reimbursement	of	costs	is,	as	in	Watts,	stressed	in	A9	of	the	Directive.	In	particular,	decisions	by	
Member	States	regarding	access	to	cross-border	health	care	and	reimbursement	of	costs	must	
be	‘properly	reasoned’	and	subject	to	challenge	via	judicial	review.60	
VI.	JURIDIFICATION,	MEDICALISATION	AND	THE	LIBERALISATION	OF	HOSPITAL	
CARE	SERVICES	
What	 light	 can	 the	 notions	 of	 juridification	 and	 medicalisation	 shed	 on	 the	 liberalisation	 of	
hospital	 care	 services	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 ECJ’s	 ruling	 in	Watts,	 and	 the	 reiteration	 of	 its	
principles	 in	 the	 Directive?	 That	 is	 the	 question	 with	 which	 the	 discussion	 in	 this	 section	 is	
concerned.	 The	 argument	will	 be	 that	 juridification	 and	medicalisation	 combine	 to	 provide	 a	
useful	framework	through	which	to	comprehend	Watts	and	the	Directive	–	not	simply	in	terms	
of	the	facts	of	that	specific	case;	but,	more	broadly,	as	regards	their	potential	implications	for	
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	 See	 Article	 1(2):	 ‘The	 Directive	 shall	 apply	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 healthcare	 to	 patients,	 regardless	 of	 how	 it	 is	
organised,	delivered	and	financed’;	and	A3,	para.	(g):	 ‘‘healthcare	provider’	means	any	natural	or	 legal	person	or	
any	other	entity	legally	providing	healthcare	on	the	territory	of	a	Member	State’.	
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the	relationship	between	 law	and	politics	 in	 the	context	of	access	 to	health	care,	and	 for	 the	
role	of	the	welfare	state	(here	represented	in	the	form	of	the	NHS)	today	vis-à-vis	the	market.	
A.	 Expropriation	and	Depoliticisation	
In	 the	 first	 instance,	Watts	 can	 be	 read	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 expropriation.	 This	 expropriation	
amounts	 to	 the	 depoliticisation	 of	 the	 fundamental	 political	 issues,	 questions,	 and	 conflicts	
surrounding	 the	 political	 project	 of	 liberalising	 hospital	 care	 services.	 In	 other	 words,	 these	
issues,	questions,	and	conflicts	(the	nature	of	which	were	outlined	earlier	and	appeared	in	parts	
of	the	Secretary	of	State’s	arguments),	become	juridified	and	medicalised	–	made	subject	to	the	
legal	and	the	medical,	as	opposed	to	the	political,	system.	This	can	be	illustrated	by	returning	to	
the	 ECJ’s	 ruling.	 As	 noted,	 whether	 or	 not	 undue	 delay	 exists	 in	 particular	 cases	 is	 to	 be	
measured	 through	 the	 performance	 of	 an	 objective	 medical	 assessment	 of	 the	 patient’s	
medical	condition	and	his	or	her	particular	circumstances,	including	the	degree	of	pain	and	the	
history	and	probable	course	of	the	illness.	Should	this	assessment	result	 in	a	finding	of	undue	
delay,	the	patient’s	local	primary	care	trust	must,	subject	to	the	new	safety-risk	criteria	in	A8(6)	
of	 the	 Directive,	 authorise	 treatment	 to	 take	 place	 abroad	 and	 refund	 its	 cost.	 The	 ruling,	
however,	 also	 envisages	 a	 similar	 role	 for	 the	 domestic	 court.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 court	
undertaking	judicial	review	of	refusals	to	grant	authorisation	to	determine	whether	the	waiting	
time	on	the	NHS	exceeds	a	medically	acceptable	period	 in	the	 light	of	the	patient’s	particular	
condition	and	 clinical	 needs.	 In	order	 to	undertake	 this	 judicial	 review	 function	properly,	 the	
court,	 if	 it	 thinks	 it	 necessary,	 must	 be	 able	 to	 call	 on	 ‘wholly	 objective	 and	 impartial	
independent	 experts’	 (presumably	 medical	 experts).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 EU	
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Patients’	 Rights	 Directive	 does	 not	 reverse	 this	 depoliticisation;	 rather,	 by	 entrenching	 those	
aspects	of	the	Watts	case,	it	sustains	this	expropriation	via	law	and	medicine.	
Two	observations	can	be	made	regarding	 this	expropriation	of	politics,	via	 law	and	medicine,	
created	 by	 the	 ECJ	 in	 Watts.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 medical	 professionals	 and	 judges	 become	
extremely	 powerful	 players	 in	 determining	 both	 the	 types	 of	 political	 questions,	 issues,	 and	
conflicts	 relating	 to	 the	 liberalisation	of	hospital	 care	 services	within	 the	EU	 identified	earlier	
and	the	extent	to	which	this	political	project	materialises	in	practice.	The	degree	to	which	NHS	
resources	 flow	 to	other	EU	countries,	 thereby	 supporting	 liberalisation,	 lies	 very	much	 in	 the	
hands	of	medics	and	 lawyers.	This	has	 implications	 for	 the	traditional	 role	of	domestic	courts	
within	the	UK	when	deciding	disputed	cases	involving	the	allocation	of	scarce	NHS	resources	–	a	
role	that	touches	centrally	on	the	relationship	between	law	and	politics.	
When	dealing	with	 challenges	 to	decisions	made	by	health	authorities	or	primary	 care	 trusts	
regarding	 the	 allocation	 of	 scarce	 health	 care	 resources	 within	 the	 NHS,	 judges	 adopt	 a	
restrained	approach	to	their	judicial	review	function.61	This	approach	focuses	upon	ascertaining	
the	lawfulness	of	these	decisions,	and	the	health	care	policies	upon	which	they	are	based.	The	
underlying	constitutional	principle	this	is	meant	to	reflect	is	the	separation	of	powers,	in	which	
the	 judiciary	 confines	 its	 role	 to	 the	 policing	 of	 public	 (political)	 power,	 rather	 than	 its	
usurpation.	There	is	no	question	of	the	courts	intervening	to	determine	the	direction	in	which	
																																																																		
61
	As	one	judge	said	in	an	early	case:	‘It	is	not	for	this	court,	or	indeed	any	court,	to	substitute	its	own	judgment	for	
the	 judgment	 of	 those	 who	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources.’	 R	 v.	 Central	 Birmingham	 Health	
Authority,	ex	parte	Walker	 (1987)	3	BMLR	32,	at	32,	per	Sir	 John	Donaldson	MR.	While	 this	 restrained	approach	
continues	 to	 be	 adopted	 in	 the	 case	 of	 substantive	 judicial	 review,	where	 procedural	 review	 is	 concerned,	 the	
English	courts	have	become	less	reluctant	to	intervene	in	recent	years,	as	cases	like	R	v.	North	West	Lancashire	HA,	
ex	parte	A,	D,	and	G	[2000]	1	WLR	977	and	R	(Ann	Marie	Rogers)	v.	Swindon	Primary	Care	Trust	and	the	Secretary	
of	State	[2006]	EWCA	Civ	166	demonstrate.	
Page	|	36		
	
scarce	public	health	 care	 resources	 should	 flow.	Here,	 the	 legal	 is	 clearly	 separated	 from	 the	
political.	As	Thomas	Poole	has	noted,	the	redeeming	feature	of	judicial	review	lying	at	the	heart	
of	this	interpretation	of	the	judicial	review	role	is	its	‘removed	or	intermediate	quality’,	meaning	
that	it	‘has	as	its	object	the	legitimacy	of	governmental	(or	public)	decision-making’,	rather	than	
‘fundamental	 questions	 of	 justice	 and	 morality’.62	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 delineation	 of	
functions	lies	in	the	conviction	that	judges	are	not	best	placed	to	‘make	the	final	determination	
in	important	political	matters	...	[T]o	allow	the	ultimate	decision	on	the	prioritisation	of	values	
to	rest	with	the	judges	smacks	of	abandoning	a	democratic	system	in	favour	of	one	layered	with	
aristocracy	(the	decisions	of	the	few	best)’.63	
The	practice	of	the	judiciary	 in	domestic	cases	 involving	questions	of	allocation	of	health	care	
resources	 has	 not	 escaped	 critique.	 Keith	 Syrett,	 for	 instance,	 has	 argued	 that	 judges	 should	
undertake	their	judicial	review	function	more	rigorously,	and	to	much	greater	effect,	than	they	
have	done	to	date.64	In	Syrett’s	view,	courts	ought	to	ensure	that	those	empowered	to	allocate	
resources	 explain	 clearly,	 and	with	 the	 support	 of	 concrete	 evidence,	 the	 reasons	 why	 they	
decided	to	allocate	resources	as	they	did.	This	more	rigorous	judicial	approach	would	not	only	
render	decisions	about	allocation	transparent	to	both	the	individuals	affected	and	the	broader	
public;	 the	 public	 understanding	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 such	 decisions	 facilitated	 by	 this	would	 also	
work	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	of	those	making	the	decisions.	 In	turn,	this	would	heighten	
the	possibility	of	democratic	debate	on	the	question	of	health	care	rationing.	This	exhortation	
to	 judges	 to	 do	 more	 in	 the	 context	 of	 judicial	 review,	 however,	 in	 no	 way	 upsets	 the	
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	T	Poole,	 ‘Questioning	Common	Law	Constitutionalism’	(2005)	25	L.S.	142,	161.	Emphasis	 in	original.	Reference	
omitted.	
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characterisation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 politics	 described	 above.	 Rather,	 in	
suggesting	 that	 public	 law	 can	 work	 to	 enhance	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 public	 power,	 Syrett’s	
argument	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 the	 political	 underpinning	 this	
understanding	 of	 judicial	 review.	 Judges	 should	 not	 be	 exercising	 the	 type	 of	 political	 power	
involved	 in	determining	 the	 flow	of	 scarce	public	 health	 care	 resources.	 They	 should,	 rather,	
police	it,	and	the	processes	surrounding	its	exercise,	to	greater	effect	–	including	to	the	end	of	
enhancing	politics	and	the	political.	
In	 respect	 of	 patients	 whose	 legal	 challenge	 is	 directed	 towards	 their	 wish	 to	 obtain	 NHS	
treatment	 that	 has	 been	 denied	 them,	 there	would	 seem	 to	 be	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	
Watts	 ruling	 would	 alter	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	 courts’	 judicial	 review	 role.	 However,	 in	
relation	to	applications	by	patients	seeking	to	challenge	refusals	of	prior	authorisation	by	their	
local	primary	care	 trust	 to	 travel	 to	another	EU	Member	State	 to	 receive	hospital	 treatment,	
the	ECJ’s	ruling	in	Watts	collapses	this	distinction	between	the	legal	and	the	political	inherent	in	
the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 the	 function	 of	 judicial	 review.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 the	 domestic	
court	 that	 must	 determine	 whether	 the	 NHS	 waiting	 time	 for	 the	 relevant	 treatment	 upon	
which	 the	 refusal	 is	based	exceeds	a	medically	acceptable	period	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	patient’s	
particular	condition	and	clinical	needs.	This	role	goes	beyond	ascertaining	the	lawfulness	of	the	
refusal	(and,	 in	the	event	of	a	finding	of	unlawfulness,	referring	the	decision	back	to	the	local	
primary	 care	 trust	 for	 reconsideration),	 to	 ruling	 on	whether	 there	 has,	 in	 fact,	 been	 undue	
delay.	In	these	circumstances,	the	allocation	of	NHS	resources	will	depend	upon	the	nature	of	
this	 ruling.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 judicial	 review	 from	 one	 displaying	 Poole’s	
‘removed	 or	 intermediate	 quality’	 to	 one	 of	 ‘[making]	 the	 final	 determination	 in	 important	
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political	matters’	–	namely,	whether	or	not	scarce	NHS	resources	are	taken	out	of	the	system,	
with	 all	 the	 potential	 consequences	 and	 costs	 (including	 those	 of	 a	 political	 nature)	 this	
determination	entails.	
Linked	to	this	constitutional	shift	in	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	law	and	politics,	the	
second	observation	regarding	the	expropriation	of	politics	facilitated	by	the	ECJ	in	Watts	is	that	
the	determination	of	 these	political	matters	occurs	 in	a	depoliticised	manner.	 In	other	words,	
these	 fundamental	 political	matters	 are	not	only	wrenched	 from	 the	domain	of	 the	political;	
they	 are	 also,	 in	 the	 process,	 distorted	 as	 they	 become	 subjected	 to	 the	 medical	 and	 legal	
systems.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 UK	 taxpayers’	 money	 should	 be	 diverted	 to	
health	care	providers	abroad,	with	the	potential	consequences	for	NHS	patients,	Government	
finances	 and	 health	 care	 planning	 this	 entails,	 is	 converted	 into	 a	 question	 of	 the	 particular	
clinical	needs	of	 individual	patients	and	whether	 they	are	enduring	undue	delay	on	 the	NHS.	
Rendering	 the	 issue	of	 travelling	 to	another	EU	Member	State	 to	obtain	hospital	 treatment	a	
matter	of	clinical	and	judicial	judgment	serves	to	pre-empt	any	debate	amongst,	or	anticipatory	
resistance	by,	citizens	concerned	about	the	deployment	of	NHS	resources	to	the	furtherance	of	
the	 project	 of	 developing	 an	 EU	 internal	 market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services.	 The	 result	 is	 an	
instance	 of	Mathiesen’s	 ‘silent	 silencing’	 –	 the	 ability	 of	 law	 (and	 in	 this	 case	 medicine)	 ‘to	
transform	 political	 questions	 of	 conflict	 into	 apparently	 neutral,	 technical	 and	 professional	
questions’.65	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 facilitating	 the	 type	 of	 democratic	 debate	 on	 health	 care	
rationing	 that	 Syrett	 argues	 ought	 to	 be	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 of	 a	 more	 rigorous	 judicial	
approach	to	cases	involving	the	allocation	of	NHS	resources,	the	focus	on	medical	evidence	and	
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clinical	 judgment	 regarding	 particular	 patients’	 medical	 conditions	 and	 clinical	 histories	
resulting	 from	Watts	 and	 the	Directive	ensures	 that	 the	 function	of	 judicial	 review	will	 be	 to	
close	this	possibility	down.	
B.	 Expansion	of	Law,	the	NHS	and	Ambivalence	
As	 well	 as	 expropriation,	 Watts	 and	 the	 Directive	 can	 be	 perceived	 through	 the	 lens	 of	
juridification	in	the	sense	of	Habermas’s	definition	of	an	expansion	of	law.	This	occurs	through	
the	application	of	EU	law	–	specifically	the	free	movement	rules	–	for	the	first	time	to	the	issue	
of	accessing	NHS	resources	for	the	purpose	of	receiving	hospital	treatment.	A	new	legal	basis	is	
therefore	established	 for	obtaining	access	 to	 these	 resources.	Of	 course,	 in	order	 for	 this	 EU	
legal	provision	to	be	effective,	it	must,	in	cases	where	a	system	of	prior	authorisation	is	in	place,	
first	be	established	 that	 the	 individual	 is	enduring	undue	delay.	Assuming,	however,	 that	 this	
can	 be	 proved,	 EU	 law	 effectively	 creates	 a	 new	 legal	 right	 to	 access	 NHS	 resources	 for	 the	
purpose	of	obtaining	hospital	treatment	–	something	that	has	not	been	a	part	of	domestic	law	
in	the	UK.	
Like	 Habermas’s	 observations	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 legal	 rights	 to	 the	 welfare	 state’s	 monetary	
benefits,	 this	 new	 EU	 legal	 entitlement	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 outside	 one’s	 own	 Member	
State,	 and	 to	 be	 reimbursed	 for	 it,	 might	 be	 thought	 to	 have	 important	 consequences.	
However,	 unlike	 those	 Habermas	 identifies	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 the	
contradictory	 freedom-denying	 effect	 of	 legal	 entitlements	 designed	 to	 guarantee	 freedom,	
and	 the	 impact	 on	 communities	 of	 wrenching	 social	 issues	 from	 their	 social	 and	 historical	
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origins66	 –	 the	 locus	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 EU	 law,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 is	 to	 be	 found	 elsewhere.	 Of	
course,	the	political	implications	of	EU	law	here	–	discussed	above	–	clearly	represent	one	set	of	
important	 consequences.	 There	 are,	 however,	 others	 too.	 In	 particular,	 one	 effect	might	 be	
thought	to	occur	not	at	the	level	of	the	community	or	 lifeworld	per	se,	but	 in	relation	to	that	
welfare	institution	with	which	we	are	concerned	here	–	namely,	the	NHS.	That	is,	there	exists	a	
real	danger	that	the	rights	of	the	individual	will	compromise	the	solidary	principle	upon	which	
the	NHS	was	founded.	In	other	words,	the	right	to	access	hospital	care	treatment	in	another	EU	
Member	 State	may,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	mean	 those	 in	 dire	 need	of	 an	operation,	 but	who	 are	
unable,	for	instance,	to	travel	abroad,	are	not	treated	(or	not	treated	timeously),	as	funds	are	
diverted	to	reimburse	those	taking	advantage	of	EU	law.	Of	course,	this	is	exactly	the	problem	
Newdick	has	addressed	in	some	of	his	recent	work.67	What	Habermas	directs	us	to,	though,	is	
the	importance	of	the	legal	basis	of	such	a	potential	consequence.	For	the	threat	to	the	NHS’s	
solidary	basis	 results	not,	 to	use	Habermas’s	words,	as	a	side	effect	of	 juridification	but	 from	
the	 form	 of	 juridification	 itself.	 It	 is	 the	 novel	 application	 of	 an	 individual	 legal	 entitlement	
within	 EU	 law	 to	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 where	 no	 right	 has	 previously	 existed	 that	
endangers,	not	the	freedom	of	the	beneficiaries	that	Habermas	describes,	but	the	community	–	
solidary	 –	 ethos	 upon	which	 the	NHS	was	 founded.	 To	 put	 it	 another	way,	 the	 juridification	
evident	in	Watts	and	the	new	Directive,	that	via	the	free	movement	rules	creates	legal	subjects	
who	pursue	their	private	interests,	fails	to	pay	due	regard	to	the	social	basis	of	the	NHS,	with	its	
planned	waiting	lists	and	objective	of	an	equitable	distribution	of	resources.	
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	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	one	of	the	key	health	care	policies	of	recent	UK	governments	has	been	an	emphasis	on	
devolving	health	care	to	individuals	and	their	families,	thereby	seeking	to	alter	the	perception	that	the	NHS	is	the	
only	legitimate	provider	of	health	care.	For	the	latest	affirmation	of	this	policy,	see	Department	of	Health,	op.	cit.	
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	 See	Newdick,	 ‘Citizenship,	 Free	Movement	 and	Health	 Care:	 Cementing	 Individual	 Rights	 by	 Corroding	 Social	
Solidarity’,	op.	cit.	
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While	this	is	true,	like	Habermas’s	understanding	of	juridification,	it	is	suggested	that	this	new	
EU	 legal	 entitlement	 is	 ambivalent.	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 ambivalence	 in	 the	 current	 context,	
however,	 differs	 from	 that	 described	 by	 Habermas.	 As	 we	 saw	 earlier,	 for	 Habermas	 the	
ambivalence	of	 the	 legal	 entitlement	 to	monetary	benefits	within	 the	welfare	 state	 lay	 in	 its	
simultaneous	freedom-guaranteeing	and	freedom-reducing	characteristics.	Insofar	as	EU	law	is	
concerned,	it	is	suggested	that	the	ambivalence	resides	in	its	effect	on	the	welfare	state,	rather	
than	the	individual.	For	while	in	one	sense	the	individual	nature	of	the	legal	entitlement	under	
EU	 law	 fails	 to	 respect	 the	 solidary	 nature	 of	 the	 NHS,	 it	 nevertheless	 depends	 upon	 this	
welfare	 institution’s	 continued	 existence	 for	 its	 viability.	 The	 objective	 of	 creating	 and	
maintaining	an	internal	market	in	hospital	care	services	in	which	individuals	exercise	their	free	
movement	 rights	 to	 travel	 to	 other	 EU	Member	 States,	 relies	 upon	 the	 resources	 of	welfare	
state	 institutions.	 Liberalisation	has	 dependencies.	 Thus,	while	 being	 contrary	 to	 the	 solidary	
basis	 of	 the	 NHS,	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 this	 EU	 legal	 entitlement	 comes,	 like	 the	
beneficiaries	 Habermas	 describes,	 to	 depend	 on	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 public	 resources	 in	 a	
more	general	sense.	The	latter	describes	the	importance	of	what	might	be	called	public	wealth	
to	 the	 success	of	 the	 free	movement	provisions.	Of	 course,	 this	public	wealth	has	a	 financial	
component	–	the	publicly	funded	resources	allocated	to	the	NHS	by	central	Government.	But	it	
might	 also	 be	 thought	 to	 encompass	 a	 non-financial	 public	 resource	 or	 wealth	 too	 –	 for	
instance,	 the	 publicly	 funded	 doctors	 and	 judges	 whose	 responsibility	 it	 is	 to	 conduct	 the	
necessary	 objective	 medical	 assessments	 of	 individual	 patients’	 conditions	 with	 a	 view	 to	
establishing	 the	 existence	 of	 undue	 delay.	 EU	 law	 therefore	 ensures	 that	 the	 skill,	 time,	 and	
labour	of	these	public	servants	will	function	as	core	features	of	the	development	of	the	internal	
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market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services	 –	 part	 of	 which	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 benefit	 commercial	
providers	of	health	care	around	the	EU.68	
This	ambivalent	effect	of	juridification	arising	from	EU	law	therefore	enables	the	identification	
of	the	types	of	foundations	that	are	necessary	for	both	the	establishment	of	an	internal	market	
in	hospital	care	services	within	the	EU	and	an	increased	role	for	private	health	care	providers.	
That	 these	are	possible	 consequences	 flowing	 from	 the	Watts	 ruling	does	not	 seem	 to	be	 in	
doubt.	Szyszczak	argues	that	the	ECJ	has	sought	to	‘maximise	free	movement	rights	[those	legal	
rights	 underlying	 the	 liberalisation	of	 access	 to	 hospital	 care	 services]	 and	 give	 them	greater	
priority	as	market	opening	legal	tools’.69	Moreover,	she	suggests	that	free	movement	rules	tend	
to	assume,	rather	than	question,	 ‘that	services	relating	to	a	range	of	healthcare	provision	are	
‘economic’’.70	 Some	 evidence	 exists	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	
practice.	For	instance,	in	their	analysis	of	the	actual	impact	of	ECJ	rulings	on	patient	mobility	on	
national	health	care	systems	within	the	EU,	Baeten	et	al	describe	the	possibility	of	these	rulings	
being	 used	 either	 by	 domestic	 health	 care	 providers	 or	 governments	 to	 increase	 the	 role	 of	
commercial	 providers	 of	 health	 care	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 patients.71	 This	 would	 allow	
governments	to	contract	out	the	provision	of	publicly	funded	health	care	to	private	providers,	
thereby	allowing	those	enduring	undue	delay	within	the	NHS	to	be	treated	domestically,	rather	
than	 having	 to	 travel	 abroad.	 Similarly,	 the	 authors	 note	 that	 while	 the	 UK	 Department	 of	
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	For	a	brief	discussion	of	how	the	ECJ’s	judgments	on	the	free	movement	of	patients	may	facilitate	a	greater	role	
for	private	providers	of	publicly	funded	health	care	within	the	UK,	see	G	Davies,	‘The	Effect	of	Mrs	Watts’	Trip	to	
France	on	the	National	Health	Service’	(2007)	18	King’s	College	Law	Journal	158,	166.	
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	Szyszczak,	‘Legal	Tools	in	the	Liberalisation	of	Welfare	Markets’,	op.	cit.,	285.	Emphasis	added.	
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	Ibid.,	286.	Reference	omitted.	
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	 R	 Baeten	 et	 al,	 The	 Europeanisation	 of	 National	 Health	 Care	 Systems:	 Creative	 Adaptation	 in	 the	 Shadow	 of	
Patient	Mobility	 Case	 Law	 (Brussels:	 OSE	 Paper	 Series,	 2010).	 The	 authors	 refer	 to	 Belgium	 and	 the	 UK	 in	 this	
respect.	
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Health	Guidance	 issued	 in	 the	 light	of	Watts	 speaks	of	 the	NHS	allowing	 for	planned	hospital	
care	abroad	after	prior	authorisation,	 it	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	patients	may	be	
treated	outside	of	the	public	health	care	system	of	the	country	of	treatment	–	that	 is,	by	for-
profit	 providers.	 The	 Guidance	 suggests	 that,	 in	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 free	 movement	
provisions	of	the	Treaty	will	be	in	the	interest	of	the	patient.	This	supports	the	market-opening	
possibilities	of	the	Watts	ruling	and,	now,	of	the	Directive	too.	
Analysing	the	legal	foundation	of	these	possibilities	therefore	helps	to	shed	light	on	the	various	
elements	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 supporting	 the	 creation	of	 the	 internal	market	 in	hospital	 care	
services	and	the	potential	for	an	increased	role	for	private	health	care	providers.	In	particular,	
the	 ambivalent	 nature	 of	 the	 juridification	 arising	 from	 EU	 law	 raises	 questions	 about	
characterisations	 of	 the	 Watts	 case	 that	 detect	 in	 it	 a	 conflict	 or	 tension	 between	 the	
liberalisation	 of	 EU	 health	 care	 services	 (the	 market)	 and	 the	 social	 nature	 of	 the	 right	
established	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 accessing	 these	 services	 (the	 social).	 Davies,	 for	 instance,	 has	
argued	that	the	case	discloses	a	theme	of	 ‘the	gradual	development	of	social	rights	[the	near	
right	to	adequate	medical	care]	in	Community	law,	in	an	attempt	to	balance	the	claimed	market	
bias.’72	 As	 noted,	 there	 is	 no	doubt	 that	Watts,	 and	now	 the	Directive,	 creates	 a	 conditional	
legal	 right	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 in	 other	 EU	 Member	 States.	 But	 this	 social-market	
interpretative	framework,	which,	through	its	idea	of	the	need	to	balance	these	two	elements,	
views	them	as	somehow	in	conflict,	is	in	need	of	critical	analysis.	In	one	sense,	this	is	because	
the	 social	 right	 in	 this	 context	 does	 not	 function	 as	 a	 counter-weight	 to	 ‘market	 bias’,	 but,	
rather,	as	a	necessary	feature	of	the	internal	market’s	development	in	the	field	of	EU	hospital	
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care	 provision.	 Giving	 patients	 rights	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 services	 outside	 of	 their	 own	
countries	is	essential	as	a	means	of	creating	increased	demand	for	such	services	within	the	EU	
and	the	potential	for	a	greater	role	for	commercial	providers	in	the	provision	of	these	services	–	
a	prerequisite	for	the	establishment	of	competitive	markets.	
In	 another	 sense,	 and	 as	 already	 noted,	 the	 social-market	 distinction	 fails	 to	 capture	 the	
indispensability	of	a	welfare	institution	like	the	NHS	to	the	success	of	a	market	in	hospital	care	
services.	As	no	EU	health	care	budget	from	which	funds	can	be	drawn	exists,	patients	must	be	
funded	 by	 their	 domestic	 health	 care	 systems	 to	 travel	 abroad,	 thereby	 enabling	 the	
establishment	of	 the	 internal	market.	 Indeed,	 as	hinted	at	 above,	 it	might	be	better	 to	 think	
through	the	establishment	of	markets	and	the	potential	for	greater	commercial	involvement	in	
this	area	as	being	grounded	in	what	might	be	called	the	public,	rather	than	the	social.	For	this	
would	highlight	the	public	foundations	of	these	effects	of	EU	law	–	NHS	funds	to	be	sure,	but	
also	 the	 legal	 and	 medical	 systems	 and	 their	 funds	 and	 servants.	 It	 would	 also	 assist	 in	
identifying	the	inextricable	link	between	the	public	and	the	private	disclosed	by	EU	law	in	this	
area.	For	rather	than	setting	in	train	an	instance	of	the	much	critiqued	wholesale	privatisation	
of	public	goods	and	services	–	that	is,	the	conversion	of	those	goods	and	services	into	private	
ones	 by	 means	 of	 dispossession	 –	 EU	 law	 rather	 puts	 in	 place	 the	mechanisms	 required	 to	
facilitate	 the	periodic	extraction	of	 resources	 from	a	continuing	 system	of	public	wealth.	The	
public	resources	and	services	of	the	NHS	are	not	in	any	way	privatised	as	a	result	of	EU	law	(as	
noted	earlier,	Member	 States	 are	 to	 retain	 the	 right	 to	determine	 the	nature	of	 their	 health	
care	 systems);	 instead,	 their	 continuation	 as	 public	 goods	might	 be	 thought	 to	 be	 crucial	 to	
ensure	the	presence	of	a	secure,	large	fund	from	which	money	can	periodically	be	extracted	to	
Page	|	45		
	
support	 the	 EU	 internal	 market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services,	 including,	 potentially	 at	 least,	 the	
profits	of	commercial	health	care	providers.	Relying	on	the	private	resources	of	 individuals	to	
sustain	 this	 market	 and	 those	 types	 of	 provider,	 especially	 given	 the	 current	 financial	
predicament	 of	many	 European	Member	 States,	would	 not	 be	 a	 viable	 option.	 And	 it	 is	 this	
financial	component	of	the	flow	of	public	wealth	which	is	to	be	organised,	or	managed,	by	its	
other,	 institutional,	 facet	 –	 the	 public	 systems	 and	 servants	 of	 law	 and	medicine.	What	 the	
ambivalent	nature	of	the	juridification	to	be	found	here	helps	to	reveal,	then,	is	the	structured	
nature	of	liberalisation	–	the	latter’s	manifestation	being	the	development	of	the	EU’s	internal	
market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services,	 together	 with	 the	 prospect	 for	 increased	 commercial	
involvement	 in	 its	operation.	 Like	all	markets,	 this	market	does	not	 spring	up	 from	nowhere.	
Rather,	 its	 creation	 and	 sustenance	 requires,	 and	 depends	 upon,	 structures	 and	 institutional	
bases.73	 In	 the	 current	 context,	 these	 take	 the	 form	 of	 law,	medicine,	 and	 the	 public	 funds	
allocated	to	the	NHS.	
C.	 Juridification,	Medicalisation	and	Bureaucracy	
This	 brings	 us	 to	 a	 final	 observation	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 juridification,	
medicalisation,	 and	 EU	 law	 on	 patient	 mobility.	 It	 was	 noted	 earlier	 in	 the	 article	 that	 a	
common	 theme	 of	 Habermas’s	 juridification	 and	 McLean’s	 and	 Illich’s	 understandings	 of	
medicalisation	 was	 the	 bureaucratic	 nature	 of	 the	 welfare	 state.	 Among	 other	 things,	 their	
work	can	be	viewed	as	a	critique	of	the	welfare	state	for	its	alleged	technocratic	and	scientific	
																																																																		
73
	For	the	importance	of	structures	generally	to	the	creation	and	operation	of	markets,	see,	for	example,	D	Harvey,	
A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(Oxford:	OUP,	2005);	L	Panitch	and	M	Konings,	‘Myths	of	Neoliberal	Deregulation’	
(2009)	57	New	Left	Review,	67-83;	P	Bourdieu,	The	Social	Structures	of	the	Economy	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2005);	and	
E	Christodoulidis,	‘The	Politics	of	Liquid	Modernity:	Polanyi	and	Bauman	on	Commodification	and	Fluidity’,	in	J	
Přibáň	(ed),	Liquid	Society	and	Its	Law	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2007),	101.	
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nature.	Specifically,	the	charge	levelled	at	the	medicine	and	law	of	the	welfare	state	is	its	denial	
of	 individual	 power	 and	 freedom	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	welfare	 state’s	wrenching	 of	 a	 variety	 of	
issues	 (including	 health,	 illness,	 and	 old	 age)	 from	 their	 social	 conditions	 of	 origin	 and	 their	
transfer	to	the	workings	of	 the	bureaucratic	state.	Habermas	sums	this	up	when	he	says	that	
‘legalized	social	intervention’	transfers	such	issues	‘over	to	media	such	as	power	and	money’.	
In	 the	 light	 of	 Watts	 and	 the	 Directive,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 partially	 to	
reformulate	this	understanding	of	juridification	and	medicalisation.	For	while	it	is	true	that	the	
exercise	 of	 the	 legal	 right	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 within	 the	 EU	 depends	 on	 the	 clinical	
assessment	of	an	individual’s	medical	condition	by	the	medical	and	legal	professions,	from	the	
foregoing	 discussion	 the	 ends	 to	 which	 this	 is	 directed	 are	 not	 the	 empowerment	 of	
professionals	and	 the	efficient	 functioning	of	 the	bureaucratic	welfare	state	per	 se.	They	are,	
instead,	 and	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 empowerment	 of	 individuals,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
development	 of	 the	 internal	market	 and,	 at	 least	 potentially,	 the	 facilitation	 of	 an	 increased	
role	 for	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	 in	 the	provision	of	 publicly	 funded	health	 care.	Of	
course,	 these	 alternative	 ends	 do	 not	 negate	 the	 need	 for	 an	 efficiently	 functioning	welfare	
state	and	the	public	servants	and	institutions	entrusted	with	its	management;	indeed,	quite	the	
opposite	–	as	noted,	the	medical	and	legal	systems,	together	with	NHS	funds,	will	be	integral	in	
contributing	 to	 the	 attainment	 of	 these	 objectives.	 Moreover,	 the	 ‘power	 and	 money’	
Habermas	refers	to	in	his	analysis	of	juridification	and	the	welfare	state	cannot	be	confined	to	
describing	 the	 monetary	 benefits	 distributed	 by	 the	 welfare	 state	 or	 the	 pursuit	 of	 its	
administrative	 ends;	 they	 must,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 relevant	 EU	 law,	 instead	 be	 rethought	 and	
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extended	 to	 include	 the	 power	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 markets,	 and	 the	 profit	 margins	 of	
commercial	health	care	providers.74	
The	implications	of	this	for	the	critique	of	medicalisation	undertaken	by	McLean	and	Illich	are	
mixed.	 Thus,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 law	 does,	 through	 the	 application	 of	 the	 free	 movement	
provisions,	empower	patients	by	giving	them	a	 legal	entitlement	to	access	hospital	 treatment	
within	 the	EU	 if	 they	are	enduring	undue	delay	within	 the	NHS.	By	paying	due	 regard	 to	 the	
individual’s	 particular	 medical	 circumstances,	 rather	 than	 the	 financial	 consequences	 of	
treatment	 abroad	 for	 the	management	 of	 the	 NHS,	 EU	 law	 addresses	 the	 de-individualising	
effect	 of	 medicalisation	 critiqued	 by	 Illich	 and	 McLean.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 this	
individualisation	 constitutes	 a	 mixed	 blessing	 as	 it	 remains	 tied	 up	 with	 the	 medical	 and	
dependent	upon	 the	clinical	assessments	of	members	of	 the	medical	profession.	Perhaps	 the	
key	 observation	 to	 be	 made	 about	 the	 implications	 of	 EU	 law	 on	 patient	 mobility	 for	 the	
critiques	of	medicalisation	advanced	by	Illich	and	McLean,	however,	is	not	so	much	the	degree	
to	 which	 this	 law	 addresses	 these	 authors’	 specific	 concerns,	 but	 what	 it	 reveals	 about	 the	
limitations	 of	 their	 ideas	 of	 medicalisation.	 For	 as	 conceived	 by	 Illich	 and	 McLean,	
medicalisation	 is	 intimately	 connected	 to	morality	 and	 ethics.	 The	 critique	 of	medicine’s	 de-
individualising	 characteristics	 targets,	 centrally,	 the	 failure	 to	 leave	 individuals	 alone	 so	 that	
they	 can	 make	 decisions	 about	 health	 and	 illness	 based	 on	 their	 own	 value	 systems,	 and	
establish	their	own	methods	for	coping	with	the	suffering	and	pain	accompanying	illness.	 It	 is	
the	denial	of	civil	liberty	that	is	central	to	this	understanding	of	medicalisation.	The	law,	for	its	
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part,	is	found	wanting	for	its	complicity	in	this	state	of	affairs,	as	it	fails	to	deploy	the	discourse	
of	rights	as	a	means	of	reversing	the	liberty-denying	aspect	of	medicalisation.	
While	important,	recent	EU	law	on	patient	mobility	demands	that	we	supplement	this	notion	of	
medicalisation	by	 identifying	a	critical	 link	between	medicine,	markets,	 liberalisation,	and	 the	
potential	 for	 a	 greater	 role	 for	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 publicly	
funded	hospital	care	services.	Here,	 it	 is	not	 the	medicine-ethics-patient	 liberty	 link	that	 is	so	
prominent,	 as	 the	 relations	 between	medicine,	 law,	 and	 the	 economic.	 And,	 in	 line	with	 the	
discussion	of	the	bureaucratic	welfare	state	above,	it	 is	necessary	to	extend	Illich’s	analysis	of	
the	bureaucratic	nature	of	medicalisation	beyond	the	liberty-denying	features	he	identifies	so	
as	to	incorporate	an	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	medicine,	the	welfare	state,	and	the	
types	of	economic	ends	which,	it	has	been	argued	here,	are	a	key	feature	of	EU	law	in	this	area.	
What	role	does	medicalisation	play	in	facilitating	those	types	of	ends?	How	is	medicalisation’s	
bureaucratic	 or	 technical	 nature	 bound	 up	 with	 promoting	 a	 market	 in	 EU	 hospital	 care	
services?	What	 is	the	relation	of	 law	to	medicalisation	where	economic	 issues,	as	opposed	to	
ethical-liberal	 ones,	 are	 concerned?	 In	 short,	 in	 order	 to	 think	 through	 the	 nature	 of	
contemporary	 economic	 and	 legal	 developments	 around	 medicine	 and	 health	 care,	 it	 is	
suggested	that	we	need	to	reflect	anew	on,	and	update	our	understanding	of,	the	relationship	
between	medicalisation	and	 law	–	a	debate	that	has	been	of	such	 importance	within	medical	
law	historically.	
VII.	 CONCLUSION	
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EU	law	on	patient	mobility	is	designed	to	contribute	to	the	liberalisation	of	the	provision,	and	
receipt,	 of	 health	 care	 services	 within	 the	 EU.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 draws	 the	 NHS	 into	 this	
pursuit	of	the	objective	of	liberalisation	and	confirms	that	its	resources	–	financial	and	human	–	
can	be	deployed	 to	 further	 it.	 It	has	been	argued	 that	 the	architecture	 the	ECJ,	and	now	the	
Directive,	have	put	in	place	to	facilitate	the	NHS’s	involvement	masks	or	depoliticises	the	types	
of	 fundamental	 political	 issues	 outlined	 in	 this	 article.	 This	 occurs	 by	 converting	 these	 issues	
into	a	technical	matter	revolving	around	the	assessment	of	the	clinical	conditions	and	needs	of	
individual	 patients,	 and	 a	 judgment	 as	 to	whether	 they	 are	 suffering	undue	delay	within	 the	
NHS.	 Clearly,	 medical	 professionals	 have	 a	 key	 role	 to	 play	 here.	 But	 it	 is	 the	 law,	 too,	
specifically	 public	 law,	 via	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 judicial	 review	 function	 of	 domestic	 courts	 in	
those	cases	where	patients	have	been	refused	prior	authorisation	to	receive	hospital	treatment	
abroad,	that	becomes	 involved	 in	determining	the	presence	of	undue	delay	–	and	thus	 in	the	
depoliticisation	this	entails.	The	result	is	an	ironic	one:	the	furtherance	of	the	political	project	of	
liberalising	access	to	EU	health	care	services	is	founded	upon	depoliticising	mechanisms.	It	has	
been	 argued	 that	 this	 application	 of	 EU	 law	 has	 additional,	 and	 broader,	 ramifications	 –	
especially	 for	understandings	 about	 the	 relationship	between	 the	welfare	 state	 and	markets,	
and	how	contemporary	law	and	medicine	are	involved	in	this.	
The	analytical	framework	of	juridification	and	medicalisation	has	been	deployed	in	an	effort	to	
think	through	the	nature	of	these	effects	of	recent	UE	law	on	patient	mobility.	What	emerges	
from	the	analysis	is	not	only	how	those	notions	may	help	in	undertaking	such	a	reflection,	but	
also	how	juridification	and	medicalisation	–	developed	by	the	authors	identified	in	this	article	as	
means,	 inter	 alia,	 of	 critiquing	 the	 freedom-denying	 and	 bureaucratic	 characteristics	 of	 the	
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welfare	 state	 –	 may,	 as	 concepts,	 require	 updating	 and	 reformulating	 so	 as	 to	 capture	
contemporary	 legal	 developments	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 the	medical	 and	 health	 care	 spheres.	 In	
particular,	 it	 is	 the	 economic	 aspect	 of	 those	 developments	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 traditional	
understandings	of	the	role	of	the	welfare	state	(the	NHS)	and	what	has	here	been	called	public	
wealth,	that	the	notions	of	juridification	and	medicalisation	must	seek	to	explain	today.	
